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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Research Motivation and Objective 
The existing transmission system networks were originally designed to best accom­
modate certain general ion/load patterns such as those arising from centralized dispatch, 
which tend to favor the larger and more economic units. However, the power system 
has been shifting from a regulated system to a deregulated and uncertain, competitive 
market environment. The load/generation patterns resulting from the market activities 
can be quite different from those for which they were originally planned. This exerts un­
precedented and severe pressures on the e.xisting transmission system by worsening flow 
congestion and decrecising security margins. Furthermore, competition also inevitably 
drives the market participants to operate their components or system closer to their 
security limits. 
On the other hand, maintaining system reliability is still the basis for the proper 
planning and operation of the bulk electric power system. The traditional deterministic 
security assessment approaches tend to be conservative by emphasizing the most severe, 
credible event. With the increased competition, engineers face more pressure, from 
economic imperatives in the market places, to operate the system closer to or even 
beyond the traditional deterministic limits. Therefore, more refined methods are needed 
to provide more accurate security assessment results, which should be able to take into 
account the probabilistic nature of many uncertain variables in the decision-making 
environment. 
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Motivatcxl l)y tliis industry need, the objective of this research is to develop cpianti-
tative risk based methodologies for system security assessment with the consideration of 
the probabilistic nature of electric bulk system behavior. It includes following fivo parts: 
1 .  Impact assessment for RBSA: 
Impact assessment is an indispensable part of risk assessment. It quantifies the 
cost-consequence or severity of different events. In this dissertation, an integrated 
and uniform method is developed for assessing impact for overload, voltage and 
dynamic insecurity. 
2. Transformer overload assessment: 
Identifying decision-making criteria on how to fully utilize transformer is always 
of great interest. The incentive to heavily load power transformers is being further 
driven by the need to achieve increased profits and the related reluctance to invest 
in new facilities in today's deregulated environment. In this dissertation, a method 
for assessing the risk associated with high loading on transformers used in the bulk 
transmission systems is developed. This method is helpful in making decisions 
related to trading off risk against the economic benefits that may result from a 
transformer loading level. 
•3. Risk assessment for special protection systems: 
Special protection systems are perceived as attractive alternatives to constructing 
new transmission facilities because they can be placed in service relativel\- quickly 
and ine.xpensively. However, excessive reliance on SPS can result in increased 
risk. Because SPS are normally armed only under stressed conditions, when their 
failure would result in very severe consequences, this risk can be significant. In 
this dissertation, a method is developed for assessing risk associated with special 
protection systems. This method is useful for various SPS-related decision making 
problems. 
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t. Risk assfssnif rit for bilateral transactions: 
W ith tlic rapidly increasing number of transactions, transaction analysis in dereg­
ulated power system is becoming an important issue. It is of great interest on 
assessing impact on system security brought by bilateral transactions in a dereg­
ulated environment. In this dissertation, a method is developed for assessing risk 
brought by multiple simultaneous transactions. The risk index associated with 
each transaction could be used for many purposes, especially for transmission 
pricing and congestion management in a deregulated environment. 
5. Risk based optimal power flow: 
OPF is used to schedule power system controls to optimize an objective function 
while satisfying a set of nonlinear equality and inequality constraints. Risk based 
OPF developed in this dissertation provides a necessary decision-making tool to 
help the system operator to balance system risk and cost in current deregulated 
competitive power market. 
1.2 Research Background 
1.2.1 Reliability, Adequacy, Security, and Risk 
The generally accepted definitions of reliability, adequacy and security in power in­
dustry are given by the North .A^merican Reliabilit\' Council (XERC). .According to [1]. 
reliability is defined as "the degree of performance of the elements of the bulk electric 
system that results in electricity being delivered to customers within accepted stan­
dards and in the amount desired." So, power system reliabilitj' is often measured by 
using probabilistic indices such as LOLP (loss of load probability), EUE (e.xpected un­
served energy). S.AIDI (system average interruption duration index), etc. [2]. It can 
be addressed by considering two basic and functional aspects of the electric system -
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ti(l<H|uacv and security [I]. 
Adccjuacy is defined as "the ability of the electric system to supply the aggregate 
clertrical demand and energy requirements of the customers at all times, taking into 
account scheduled and reasonably e.xpected unscheduled outages of the system elements 
[ 1 ] - "  
Power system security is defined as "the ability of the electric system to witlistand 
sudden disturbances such as electric short circuit or unanticipated loss of the system 
elements [I]." Traditionally, it is generally accepted that a "secure electric system" is 
one that will maintain uninterrupted supply to all loads, and all bus voltages and flows 
would be within defined ratings for all contingencies in the credible contingency set. 
There are two kinds of approaches to cissess power system security - deterministic 
based approach and risk based approach. The deterministic based approach method pro­
vides a very simple way in making this decision by picking up the worst possible scenario 
in the future. It is this simplicity that has made the deterministic method so useful in 
the past. Today, however, with the industry's emphasis on economic competition, there 
is a growing recognition that this simplicity also carries with great conservativeness. 
Therefore, there is a great deal of interest in using risk analysis to enhance the security-
economy decision making problem. Usually risk analysis consists of answers to the 
following questions [."]]: 
1. What can go wrong that could lead to an outcome of hazard e.xposure? 
2. How likely is this to happen? 
3. If it happens, what consequences are e.xpected? 
In the power industry, there is no standard definition for risk. Here, a definition provided 
by IEEE Standard Dictionary [4] is used, which defines risk associated with an event as 
"the simple product of probability and consecjuence" of the event. This definition takes 
o  
into account not only the likelihood of an events, hut also its severity. It can he viewed 
as the expected financial exposure of under stressed operating conditions suffered hy 
[>ouor system facilities. 
rVoin above definitions. It can be seen that while [)Ower system reliability is charac­
terizing the "al)ility" of the system to perform in some fashion, the risk emphasizes the 
"financial e.xposure" of the system to perform in this fashion. 
1.2.2 Risk Based Security Assessment 
There have been many reliability indices proposed in the past. .Among these, de­
terministic methods have employed performance measures such as line current, voltage 
magnitudes, and stability margins. Vet these measures only reflect severity, i.e.. they 
do not reflect likelihood. The most well known probabilistic inde.x is loss of load prob­
ability (LOLP). but this inde.x reflects only likelihood but not severity. Some other 
probabilistic indices, such as e.xpected unserved energy (EUE). and "system minutes" 
do in fact capture both likelihood and severity, but the measure of severity includes only 
load interruption excluding costs cissociated with equipment damage or the opportunity 
costs from equipment unavailability. In addition, most probabilistic indices previously 
proposed have used rather crude rules based on fi.xed bus voltage limits and fi.xed line 
current limits for identifying when load interruption would occur, and they typically 
do not include costs associated with equipment damage or the opportunity costs from 
eciuipment unavailability [5]. 
Where past reliability indices were largely measures of the system's ability to incur, 
or perhaps to avoid failure, the risk index recommended by EPR.I and developed in Risk 
Based Security .Asse-ssment (RBSA) is a mejisure of the system s e.xposure to failure [5]. 
Consequently, this risk index accounts for both likelihood and severity. In addition, it 
uses a severity model that captures all cost-consequences, including load interruption, 
equipment damage, and opportunity costs due to equipment outage. The basic relation 
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for computing risk is given by 
Risk(lni\X,) = E{{in{Xt-i.i)\Xi) 
= Y t Pr{ E.. .V,+, I .V,) X RisLi I n71 , )clX,+, (1.1) 
wlicro fin denotes an impact or cost-consec|uence associated witli load interruption, 
equipment damage, or opportunity cost due to equipment unavailability. Here the risk 
associated with the pre-contingency operating condition .V( (e.g.. loading, dispatch, volt­
age profile) is given by the e.xpected value of the monetary impact of the operating condi­
tion in the next time period .V^+i. (the ne.xt hour) given the current operating condition, 
i.e.. £"(/m(A'<+i )|A'f). This e.xpectation is a summation of the product of probability of 
the uncertain event, defined by E, (the contingency state) and Xt+i (operating condition 
in the ne.xt time step) times its corresponding impact over the set of all possible events. 
A distinctive feature of RBS.A is that the impact of a specified contingency state 
Ei for a specified operating condition A'<+i is considered to be uncertain, therefore we 
denote it as Risk{Im (The set of contingency states includes the possibility 
that the current state remains the same. i.e.. an outage does not occur.) The uncertainty 
associated with this impact depends on the nature of the impact [5]. For line overload, 
the uncertainty is in the ambient temperature, wind speed and direction, and solar flu.x. 
For transformer overload, it is in the ambient temperature and the transformers" loading 
cycle. For voltage security, it is in the interruption voltage level of the loads at each bus. 
For dynamic (angle) security, it is in the fault type and fault location of the outaged 
circuit corresponding to contingency state Ei. 
1.2.3 Features of RBSA 
Compared with traditional deterministic based security assessment methods. RBS.A 
has the following salient features [6]: 
Hrldyiny trniioinics and sfciii-itij 
I hc risk used in RBSA has explicit economic meaning in that it represents the 
expected cost due to possible insecurity problems. It measures the economic conse-
(luence of system insecurity caused by uncertain events weighted by its probability 
of occurrence. This property provides a direct bridge^ between power system eco­
nomics and security, in that it is a means to e.xplicitly include security in ordinary 
economic decision-making problems. 
Co rn posit e risk 
The risk computation reflects, for a local operating region or an entire system, the 
composite effect of all contingencies and all resulting security problems, including 
those associated with overload, voltage, and dynamic (angle) security. Therefore, 
it provides a measure of the overall security level of the region. 
Risk as a function of operating condition 
Risk is computed based on pre-contingency operating conditions. Thus, results of 
RBS.A illustrate the functional dependence of risk on pre-contingency operating 
conditions that operators are able to monitor, understand, and control. 
Risk is assignable 
Since risk could be computed for each security problem and for each contingency, it 
is easy to identify components or conditions causing it and incurring it. Knowledge 
of component ownership allows risk to be assigned to the appropriate entities. 
Risk as a leading indicator 
The basic application of the risk index is to use available information to decide 
"now" in preparation for a condition that is minutes, hours, weeks, or years into 
the future. This ability is the basis for calling the risk inde.x a leading indicator. 
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• (I Irans/nission .^tcurity cost 
Sincc composite risk could be computed and assigned to each transaction, it could 
bo regarded as a part of transmission price or transmission security costs and 
allocated among different players in the competitive power market. 
• Cumulafire risk 
If one provides a sequential trajectory of operating conditions through time, then 
risk can be calculated for each operating condition, anfl summation over all time 
instances provides a cumulative risk assessment over the specified time period. 
This cumulative risk assessment is useful for assessing the influence on security 
level of a particular facility plan. 
• Risk for decision makings 
RBS.A. provides the capability to manage security based on the decision maker(s) 
preference regarding risk e.xposure. Identification of preference is done in the con­
text of decision analysis. 
1.3 Contents of This Dissertation 
In Chapter 2. the problem of impact assessment for risk calculation is addressed. 
The comparison between rating-based and cost-based severity measures, the difference 
between impact and decision, and the issue related to uncertainty modeling of impact 
are discussed. The clcissification of impacts and some sample data in a template form 
are also presented. 
In Chapter 3, a risk-based assessment method of transformer thermal loading ca­
pability is provided. It determines a realistic estimate of transformer thermal loading 
capability by using probabilistic characterization of uncertainty, and provides a quanti­
tative risk inde.x that can be used to detect high risk situations. 
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In Chapter -I. a procedure is developed for risk based assessment of SPS. To illustrate 
the proposed approach, an example, using a portion of the IKEL reliability test system 
together with an illustration of the CIRS logic, is provided to show how to calculate 
CJRS reliability and how to integrate the influence of GFl.S reliability into the risk-based 
security assessment. 
In Chapter 5. a risk based security assessment method for bilateral power trans­
actions is presented. The method takes advantage of risk based security assessment 
i)y considering the uncertainties in the real power system operating condition. Several 
risk allocation methods for simultaneous bilateral transactions are also provided and 
compared. 
In Chapter 6. a risk b<ised optimal power flow problem is developed. A probabilistic 
load flow and a successive linear programming technique is adopted to solve the problem. 
In Chapter 7. conclusions and suggestions for future work are presented. 
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CHAPTER 2 IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR RBSA 
2.1 Introduction 
In risk assessment, one must address probability and impact. Probability analysis 
is used to quantify the uncertainties associated with various outcomes: while impact 
quantifies cost-consequence, or severity, of these outcomes. .As mentioned in [o]. devel­
opment of the severity function is typically difficult in most probabilistic risk assessment 
problems. In this chapter, some fundamental considerations of this problem is presented. 
The traditional approach to quantify impact uses performance mecisures such as load 
flow, steady state voltage magnitude, transient voltage dip. and others. The drawback of 
this approach is that there is no common measure for comparing severity or for obtaining 
a composite evaluation of security. Thus, it is difficult to quantitatively compare the 
impact between two different kinds of security problems. For example, it is not mean­
ingful to compare the impact of transient voltage dip and transmission line overload 
by comparing transient voltage magnitude and line current. Similarly, when a region 
faces more than one kind of security problem such as transmission line overload and bus 
voltage out of limits, there is no single performance indicator that can reflect the overall 
system security conditions [o]. 
In this chapter, a momentary measure is utilized as a common measure of severity. 
It is a function of the traditional performance measures (e.g. line current, bus volt­
age magnitude, transient voltage dip, etc.). This approach provides a unified basis for 
assessment for different security problems and finally provides a dollar-based risk. 
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2.2 Literature Review 
In this soction. a literature review of some related work is provided. 
2.2.1 Reliability Cost/Worth Analysis 
Reliability cost/worth analysis is to assess the costs of providing reliable service and 
cjuantify the worth of having it [2. 7]. The worth of service reliability is evaluated by 
estimating the customer interruption or outage costs. References [8. 9. 10] provide some 
e.vamples of estimating interruption costs by conducting customer surveys in Canada. 
In the US., similar research can be found in references [II. 12. 13]. 
Impact assessment for risk based security assessment (RBS.A) in this study has a 
broader meaning than reliability cost/worth analysis. It not only includes the customer 
interruption cost which is an indispensable part for RB.S.A. but it also includes the other 
costs such as equipment outage and ecjuipment damage. 
2.2.2 Rating-Based vs. Cost-Based 
In many industries where risk assessment is necessary, the uncertainty in impact 
motivates a simplistic approach where impact is quantified into a limited number of 
discrete values. For e.xample. the process control industry uses I. 2. 3. and 4 to denote 
the classification of impact severity [14 - 17]. The most e.xtreme form of this approach is 
so called the "rating-based" approach. In using the rating-based approach, it is assumed 
that violation of any traditional deterministic criteria is equally severe, i.e.. Jissign 1.0 
for violation and 0.0 otherwise. The resulting risk is an e.xpectation of the number of 
violations per time period. The advantages of this approach are that it is simple, no 
estimation is required, and it enjoys strong coupling with the deterministic approach, 
and is therefore quite intuitive and understandable. One disadvantage is that it does not 
account for differences in severity between one type of security violation and another. 
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For example, it recognizes 1% overload as l)eing equally severe to an out of step condil ion 
of a generation plant. .Another disadvantage is that the rating-based measure does not 
account for the degree of a violation. For e.xainple. it recognizes a I9c overload as being 
ec|ually severe to a 25% overload. There are ways to evolve this rating-based approach 
that retain the simplicity yet alleviate its disadvantage as one suggested in Reference 
(IS|. 
In using cost-based measure, we estimate the actual cost of an operating conditioirs 
impact. The resulting risk is an e.xpectation of the economic consecpience per time 
period. It overcomes the disacK'antage of rating-based risk in that it recognizes different 
severity levels of various violations, and it recognizes the degree of each violation. The 
main disadvantage is that cost estimates contain significant uncertainty, and reducing 
this uncertainty can be expensive. Therefore, one needs to estimate average values of 
these costs and also model the uncertainty associated with estimates. 
2.3 Impacts vs. Decisions 
Impact has many different meanings in different contexts. In the conte.xt of RBS.\. 
Irupact is defined as an inevitable consequence caused by an operating condition. So the 
impact must be treated a-s a function of operation condition. This definition excludes 
any influence of human interventions. For e.xample. the consequences of overloading a 
transmission line, such as loss of life, clearance violation, are regarded as impacts; while 
tlie consequence of manual load shedding to reduce the load on a transmission line is 
not unless one e.vplicitly wants to evaluate manual load shedding as an alternative. We 
exclude consequence related to human intervention because it is a result of decisions. 
W'e cannot model the decision without knowing the benefit function and the decision­
maker's risk preference that is unicjue to each situation. If desired, different human 
decisions can be evaluated by explicitly modeling their impacts in the risk assessment. 
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2.4 Modeling Impact Uncertainty 
Artnall\-. some impacts are quite certain. For e.xample. sanctions can be regarded as 
(•(Mtain impacts to the entity who violates security performance requirements. Western 
Systems Coordinating Council (VVSCC) has developed a Reliability Management System 
(HM.S) [20j. which includes 17 mandatory criteria for which its members are asked to 
comply. Sanctions will be applied to the entity who violates these criteria with monetary 
penalty. For e.xample. one criteria is that "The actual power flow on a bulk power path 
siiall not e.xceeci the operating transfer capability for specified time period. If the 
transmission owner violates this criterion, a certain fine should be paid based on the 
R.MS. 
However, most impacts are unfortunately quite uncertain. For e.xample. the end-user 
losses due to system disturbances depend on many uncertain factors such as the end-
user's activities, the nature and degree to which the impacted activities are dependent 
on electricity, the availability of a backup power source, and the ability to resume the 
impacted activities normally after power is restored. Consequently, estimating the im­
pact requires both objective and subjective justification. Further, it is well recognized 
that the accuracy of the cost estimate of an event occurring at a future time generally 
decrca.ses as that future time is increcised [21]. 
The first step in estimating the costs is to identify the expected or average value. This 
could be enough if the estimate is cjuite certain. However, it is generally necessary to 
account for the uncertainty in the estimate by using a probability distribution to describe 
it. The two simplest distributions are uniform, in which Ccise one needs to estimate the 
range, and normal, in which case one needs to estimate the standard deviation. Which 
one is used, or whether another distribution is used, depends on the characteristics of the 
uncertainty. For example, if the actual cost impact is equally likely within an interval, 
then the uniform distribution is appropriate. However, if the actual cost impact is more 
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likc-ly to 1)(^ close to the mean than at the extremes, then a normal distribution is a 
l>ett(T description. 
2.5 Cost Estimation 
The cost of an event can only be accurately known after actual occurrence of the 
event. Therefore, in risk assessment, where analysis is necessarily performed before 
the occurrence of the event, we must estimate its e.xpected value together with the 
parameters that describe its uncertainty. 
.-Vn essential step in cost estimation is to decompose each identified event into com­
ponent costs. Cost estimates can be assigned to each component and then costs for the 
various components are aggregated to form a cost for the event. For e.vample, to esti­
mate load interruption cost at a particular bus. one can decompose this cost into costs 
for residential, agricultural, commercial, and industrial portions of the load. Likewise, 
to estimate equipment costs caused by overload on a line, one can decompose this cost 
into cost for loss of conductor life and cost for line sag that violates clearance codes and 
consequently shorts to an underlying object. 
The second step in cost estimation is to identify the statistics associated with each 
cost. This is an information-gathering step. It need not be a labor-intensive task, 
although it certainly can be. What is important is that the analyst be capable of deciding 
when to gather more information, and when not to. Nonetheless, it is always prudent 
to perform a first estimation using one's own judgment. Here, one should estimate the 
mean or average value of the cost, the range, i.e., a minimum value below which the cost 
would not fall and a ma.ximum value above which the cost would not fall. In addition, 
one should decide the distribution of the cost over the range. .-Xs indicated in Section 
2.-1. the simplest distributions are uniform and normal. 
In many risk assessment problems, the accuracy of the cost estimate is sufficient 
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if the range spans I order of magnitude, or less. This requires that the tolerance on 
the decision criteria might need to be as large as the widest range. If the tolerance 
is unsatisfactory, then one needs to gather more information to narrow the range (i.e.. 
ch'cn^ase the spread, or variance, of the distribution). 
2.6 Classification Criteria for Impact Assessment 
The first step to conduct impact cost estimation is decomposing the cost of each 
identified event into component costs. Depending on the different criteria, there are four 
kinds of impact classifications, which not only help to estimate the impact costs but also 
provide useful information in today's deregulated environment. 
1. Based on affected group 
This classification provides information that which group is affected and how much 
each group is suffered by the different security problems under current operating 
condition. The following groups are considered: 
(a) generation owner 
Generation owners will e.Kperience losses when the conditions such as gener­
ator out of step or load interruption occur. 
(b) transmission owner 
Transmission owners will face losses when the system contingencies cause 
overloading the transmission lines or transformers or cause load interruptions. 
(c) end-user 
Los.ses might be unavoidable to the end-users when the system contingencies 
cause the load interruptions. 
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1. leased on impact component 
I his classification indicates the source of the impact cost. The following three cost 
categories are considered in this study. 
(a) load interruption 
Load interruption occurs when the system contingencies result in unaccept­
able voltage to the end-users. 
(b) equipment damage 
The impact of equipment damage ciuantifies the costs of repairing or replacing 
damaged equipment and the opportunity costs due to the unavailability of 
equipment. 
(c) equipment outage 
The impact of equipment outage includes the additional cost associated with 
operating the system when a component is unavailable. 
•i. Based on cost category 
This classification shows how the system is affected by the different security prob­
lems. It is based on the information about what parts of system are threatened. 
F'or e.xample. transmission line overload may cause loss of life and clearnce vio­
lation: while transformer overload ma\- cause loss of life and failure. The impact 
components considered in this study are 
(a) line loss of life 
This impact is caused by high conductor operating temperature. 
(b) clearance violation 
This impact is caused by high conductor operating temperature. 
(c) transformer loss of life 
This impact is caused by high transformer hottest-spot temperature. 
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(fl) transfornier failure 
Tliis impact is caused by liigh transformer hottest-spot temperature. 
(e) under- or over- voltage 
This impact is caused i)y lack of reactive power support in some buses. 
(f) voltage collapse 
This impact is caused by lack of reactive power support in the system. 
(g) generator out of step 
This impact is caused by some large disturbances in the system. 
(h) transient frequency dip 
This impact is caused by some large disturbances in the system. 
(i) transient voltage dip 
This impact is caused by some large disturbances in the system. 
-1. Based on cost component 
Th is classification presents direct information about the makeup of the impact 
cost. It is based on the information about how the impact cost is formed. For 
e.xample. the cost of transmission line overload is reconductoring the line, while 
the costs of load interruption are opportunity cost, end-user loss, sanctions, and 
penalties. The cost components considered in this study are 
(a) reconductoring the line 
This cost can be estimated from current market price of reconductoring the 
same line. 
(b) replacing the transformer 
This cost can be estimated from the cost of buying a new transformer with 




This cost can I)c obtained from tlic criteria in the regional reliability manage­
ment systems. 
(d) penalty A 
This cost can be oi)tained from the contracts between the generation owners 
and the transmission owners. 
(e) penalty B 
This cost can be obtained from the contracts between the generation owners 
and end-users. 
(f) cascading 
.\ cascading event usually results in a huge loss that is quite difficult to 
estimate because it is dependent on the system operating conditions. In this 
study, we assume that there is no cascading event. .\ preliminary study about 
impact assessment for cascading events could be found in Reference [IS]. 
(g) system redispatching cost 
This cost can be estimated from the production cost of using new higher-cost 
generators minus the production cost of using original lower-cost generators. 
(h) generator startup cost 
This cost can be estimated from actual startup cost of the generator. 
(i) opportunity cost 
This cost could be estimated from the historical data of the company's revenue 
and operating cost of the equipment. 
(j) end-user loss 
The most direct way to estimate end-user loss is conducting surveys for dif­
ferent groups of customers [7] - [12]. But usually this kind of effort is cum­
bersome. time-consuming and expensive, especially if a large and statistically 
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ucll designed sample is to he selected [13]. Sinct^ the [jenalty item in contracts 
l)el\veeii generation owners and end-users can he regarded as compensation to 
the end-users if there is load interruption, they must embed the information 
of end-user loss. Thus, one alternative to estimate end-user loss can be based 
on tlie penalty agreement in the contract. The advantages of this approach 
are easily implemented and less e.xpensive. though the accuracy might be 
sacrificed. 
2.7 Impacts for Different Security Problems 
One significant advantage of RBS.\ over traditional security assessment is that it 
unifies various security problem types, allowing quantification of the composite security 
level in a single inde.x. However, this advantage is only manifested if the magnitudes of 
the various impacts are quantified one relative to another. It is to this purpose that, 
baser! on the classification in the previous section, we have developed three impact tables: 
one for overload security, one for voltage security, and one for dynamic security. In the 
following three subsections, we present these tables together with a brief description of 
the related impacts. 
.•\s we stated before, impact assessment needs both objective and subjective judg­
ment. The classification and some estimated data presented in this section are only the 
authors" opinion. It is e.vpected that different people would give different classifications 
and estimations. 
2.7.1 Overload Security-
Power system overload will cause adverse effects to transmission lines and to trans­
formers. The following are simple descriptions of these impacts. Detailed descriptions 
of tiiese impacts can be found in [22. 23]. 
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• Liiii Current Too High 
iligh ciirrciit in the transniission line leads to high conductor operating tempera­
ture. In this report, ue consider two kinds of impacts related to high line current: 
loss of life and line sag and touch. 
— Loss  of  l i f t  
The transmission line s expected total life is the amount of lime when the con­
ductor operating temperature is always maintained at its ma.ximum allowable 
temperature. When the operating temperature is higher than the ma.ximum 
allowable value, the conductor-annealing rate can exceed the designed value. 
The line's life e.xpectancy is reduced and the impact is determined by the loss 
of life and the cost of re-conductoring the circuit. 
— Clenrnce inolalion 
High operating temperature can cause the thermal e.xpansion of the conductor 
and thus the line may drop beneath its safety clearance. L'nder this condition, 
the circuit would open, either due to overcurrent protection, operator decision, 
or in the worst case, flashover to ground resulting in a fault. The impact costs 
associated with a safety clearance violation are opportunity costs, system 
redispatching costs, sanctions, and under some conditions, cascading overload 
and widespread blackout. 
• Trnnsformer Load Too High 
High transformer load will cause high transformer hottest-spot temperature. We 
consider two kinds of impacts related to transformer overloading: loss of life and 
transformer failure. 
— Loss of Life 
The transformer insulation deteriorates as a function of time and temperature. 
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The relation of insulation cleterioration to changes in time and temperature is 
assumed to follow an adaptation of Arrhenius reaction rate theory. The im­
pact cost associated with transformer loss of life is replacing the transformer. 
— Transformer Failure 
Operating at insulated winding hottest-spot temperature above 1 10°C may-
cause gassing in the solid insulation and oil of the transformer. Gassing pro­
duces a potential risk to the dielectric strength of the transformer. The test 
results indicate that there is a gradually increasing probability of dielectric 
failure whenever normal operating temperatures are e.xceeded. and the prob­
ability of failure is significantly increased at temperatures above 150°C'. A 
catastrophic failure of a transformer results in considerable costs. When such 
a failure occurs, the event is sudden, and the consequence can be suljstan-
tial. particularly if the system is stressed. The impact costs associated with 
transformer failure might be the cost of replacing the transformer, opportu­
nity costs, system redispatching costs, penalties, sanctions, and under some 
conditions, cascading overload and widespread blackout. 
Based on the classification criteria developed in Section 2.6. Figure 2.1 shows the rela­
tionship among different classification criteria. shadowed oval bo.K represents that the 
cost component is highly uncertain: while clear oval box means that the cost component 
has little uncertainty. 
W'e recognize that one possible impact from high circuit loading is that due to load 
shedding as the operator attempt to alleviate the overload. We would include this impact 
if it were automatic. However, because it is dependent on a human decision, it is quite 
uncertain not only in terms of where and how much, but also in terms of whether it 
will happen at all. Therefore, rather than try to model this uncertainty, we think it 
prudent to have our impact assessment on the assumption that the operator will take 
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Figure 2.1 The Impact for Overload 
Pen^ty A 
no shedding action. This provides that our assessment will be conservative, and more 
important, uniform with respect to various overload situations. In Table 2.1. a table-
form template with some estimated values is given for overload impact assessment. .A.11 
the impact costs are assumed following a normal distribution e.xcept sanctions which 
are assumed certain. .A 95% confidence interval is also given for the cost of each cost 
component. 
Table 2.1 Impact Evaluation for Overload 
I m p a c t  C l a j - t i f i c a t i o n  C o . - < t  I n f o r m a t i o n  
P e r f o r m a n c e  I m p a c t  C o i t  C o s t  A f f e c t e d  L '  n i t  E x p e c t e d  S t a n d  3 S %  
M e a s u r e  C o m p o n e n t  C a t e g o r y  C o m p o n e n t  G r o u p  V a l u e  D e v  C I .  
L i n e  E q u i p m e n t  L o i d  R e c o n d u c t o r  T r a n j m i 5 9 i o n  5 / m i l e ( * )  1 0 ^  1 0 " *  ( 0  8  -  1  2 )  X  1 0 ^  
C i i r r e n i  D a m a i ; e  o f  l i f e  l i n e  O w n e r  
E q u i p m e n t  C l e a r a n c e  R e d i s p a t c h  « / M V V h r  S O  S  - l O - C O  
O u t a g e  v i o l a t i o n  S a n c t i o n s  S / M V V h r  S O  0  S O  
P e n a l t y  A  S / M W h r  1 0 . 0 0 0  0  1 0 . 0 0 0  
O p p o r t u n i t y  « / M W h r  S O  S  4 0 - C 0  
C a s c a d e  S / c o J c  0  0  0  
X f n i r  E q ' i t p r n e n t  L o d j  R e p l a c e  T r a n s m i j - ^ i o n  S / c a s e  1 0 *  1 0 * *  ( 0  8  -  1  2 )  X  1 0 '  
C u r r e n t  D a m a g e  o f  l i f e  x f m r  O w n e r  
X f m r  R e p l a c e  5 / f a i l u r e  lo' lO*"' ( 0  8  -  I  2 )  X  l O '  
f a i l u r e  x f m r  
E q u i p m e n t  X f m r  R e d i . ' t p a t c h  5 / M W h r  so s • l O - C O  
O u t a g e  f a i l u r e  S a n c t i o n s  S / M W h r  so 0  S O  
P e n a l t y  A  ? / M V V h r  1 0 . 0 0 0  0  1 0 . 0 0 0  
O p p o r t u n i t y  « / M W h r  so s 4 0 . 6 0  
C a j i c a d e  S / c a ^ e  0  0  0  
•  H c r r .  w e  o n l y  c o ^ t  e s t i m a t i o n  f o r  r e c o n d u c t o n n g  2 3 0 K V  l i n e  a n d  r e p l a c t n f ^  - l O O N I V A  t r a n ^ m u j f i o n  t r a n s f o r m e r .  
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2.7.2 Voltage Security 
riie two [)rol)lerTis associated with voltage security are l)us voltage out of limits 
and voltage collapse. The following are simple descriptions of these impacts. Detailed 
descriptions of these impacts can be foimd in [24]. 
• Bit.-y \oltagt Out-of-Lirnit 
Bus voltage out-of-limit includes situations when i)us voltage is too low or when bus 
voltage is too high. On the one hand, low bus voltages may cause induction motor 
stall and resulting high lagging current, which will further lower the bus voltages. 
Since industrial and commercial motors are usually controlled by magnetically held 
contactors, voltage drop may also cause many motors to drop out [25]. Low bus 
voltage may also cause the action of automatic undervoltage load shedding schemes 
[I]. On the other hand, when the bus voltage is too high, overvoltage protection 
schemes can automatically trip individual load or load groups if the voltage violates 
their setting thresholds. So the main impact caused by bus voltage out of limit 
is load interruption which will cause end-user loss. The transmission owners and 
generation owners will also lose profits due to the opportunity costs and have to 
pay the penalties and sanctions. 
• \'oltagc Collapse 
\\ hen a power system is subjected to a sudden increase of reactive power demand 
following a system contingency, and the additional demand can not be met by the 
reactive power reserves carried by the generators and compensators, it may lead to 
system collapse, possibly resulting in loss of synchronism of generating units and a 
major blackout. So the consequence of voltage collapse is high. The transmission 
owners and generation owners will also lose profits due to the opportunity costs 
and may have to pay the penalties and sanctions. 
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Based on the classification criteria developed in Section 2.6. Figure 2.2 sliows the 
rehitionship among different classification criteria. When voltage insecurity situation 
occurs, all the groups will be affected. End-users will suffer loss due to load interruptions. 
Iransmission owners and generation owners may also suffer loss from opportunity costs, 


























Figure 2.2 The Impact for Voltage Instability 
In Table 2.2, a table-form template with some estimated values is given for voltage 
insecurity. .All the impact costs are assumed following a normal distribution e.Kcept 
sanctions and penalties which are assumed certain. .A 95% confidence interval is also 
given for the cost of each cost component. 
2.7.3 Dynamic Security 
For dynamic security we consider the impact of transient voltage too low. transient 
frequency too low, and generator out of step. Detailed discussion of these impacts is 
presented in [26]. 
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Table 2.2 Impact Evaluation for \bltage Insecurity 
I r r i p a c t  C l ^  ! . - >  ' i h c a t i o n  • ' - J o . « t  I n f o r m a t i o n  
P r r f o r r n  a n c e  I m p a c t  C o s t  C o - ' t  A H e c t e d  L "  n i t  E x p e c t e d  ~ t a n d  0 ' .  % 
. M  ' • • 1 » « i  r r  C o n i p o n e n t  C ' a t e ^ o r y  C o m p o n e n t  ( I r o t i p  \ ' a l u e  D e v  C  I  





\ o U a | ; r  I n t e r r u p t i o n  o r  t j v e r - c o - t  »  '  v v  n  e  r  
M  . i R n i i  u < i e  V o l t a ^ e  G e n e r a t i o n  
k  ^  w  n  r  r  
5 / M W h r  'jQ 1 0 - 6 0  
^ ^ a n c t i o n . - "  T r a n - m i ' - i o n  
i . ' i  w  n  e  r  
C  f e n e r a t i o n  
I  > w n e r  
S / M W h r  
i / M  W h r  
v O  
C O  
0  C O  
1 0 - 6 0  
P e n a l t y  A  T r a n . - ' m i j ' i i o n  
1  >  w n e r  
i / M  W h r  1 0 , 0 0 0  0  1 0 . 0 0 0  
P e n a l t y  3  G e n e r a t i o n  
w w n e r  
i / M W h r  1 2 . 0 0 0  0  1 2 . 0 0 0  
E n d - u ? e r  E n d - u j e r  i / M W h r  2 0 . 0 0 0  S . O O O  l O . O O O - . ' . O . O O O  
L o - ' : *  
P \ '  C u r v e  s y s t e m  L '  n c o n t r o l l e d  i e e  a b o v r  - e c t i o n  o n  l o a d  i n t e r r t i p t i o n  
L o a d  V o l t a R r  
I n t e r r u p t i o n  D e c l i n e  
•  H e r e ,  w c  a . - ( i u m e  i h a t  a l l  t h e  r n c i - u s c r . i  a r e  c o m m e r c i a l  c a . 4 t o m e r j .  
• Transie.nl \'oltagt Dip 
Similar to bus voltage out of limits in voltage security, low transient voltage clips 
may cause some motors to drop out. They may also initiate undervoltage load 
shedding and generator tripping. So the major impact of low transient voltage dip 
is the cost of load interruption which causes end-user loss. .'\lso the generation 
owners will lose profits due to the opportunity costs and probably have to pay the 
generator startup cost, system redispatching cost, penalties and sanctions due to 
failing to fulfill the contract with end-users and violating the reliability criteria. 
• Trntjsitnl Frequency Dip 
Transient frequency dips that are too low will result in underfrequency load shed­
ding. So the impact costs of low transient frequency dips are load interruption 
which causes end-user loss. The generation owners will lose profits due to the 
opportunity costs and have to pay sanctions and penalties. 
• Generator Out of Step 
If the interconnected synchronous machines of a power system can not remain 
in synchronism following a large disturbance, one or more generators will go out 
of step. This will cause some generators to trip, and the supply energy will be 
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rrplacofl In" a higher cost source. .So the itni)act costs of a generator out of step 
coiulition are system redispatching costs and generator startuj) costs to generation 
owners. The generation owners might also liave to pay sanctions. 
Ba.sed on the classification criteria developed in Section 2.6. Figure 2.3 shows the 
relationship among different classification criteria. When dynamic insecurity situation 
occurs, end-users will suffer loss due to load interruptions. Generation owners will also 
suffer loss from system redispatching costs, generator startup cost, opportunity costs, 
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Figure 2.3 The Impact for Dynamic Instability 
In Table 2.3. a table-form template with some estimated values is given for dynamic 
insecurity. .Ml the impact costs are assumed to follow a normal distribution except 
sanctions and penalties which are assumed certain. A 95% confidence interval is also 
gi\ cn for the cost of each cost component. 
Talile 2.;} Impact Evaluation for Dynamic Insecurity 
I m p a c t  C l a « < t f i c a t i o n  C o « t  I n f o r m a t i o n  
r > f  f o r r u - i i i c c  I m p a c t  C o  * t  C o s t  A f f e c t e d  ' ' n i t  E x p e c t e d  : ^ t a n d  o s r c  
C o m p o n e n t  C a t e R o r y  C o m p o n e n t  G r o u p  ^ ' a l u e  D e v  C  I  
I ' r a n  • i r n t  L o a d  ' "  n d e r - o p p o r t u n i t y  T r a n . * m i - - . * i o n  T / M W h r  S O  S  40-t0 
I n t e r r u p t i o n  o r  I ' v e r - C 0 4 t  t  i w n e r  
D i p  V o l t a # ; e  G e n e r a t i o n  i / M W h r  ' . 0  s  40-60 
t  >  w n e r  
i a n c i i o n . - t  G e n e r a t i o n  ? / M V V h r  v O  0 so 
« " >  w  n  e  r  
P e n a l t y  B  G e n e r a t i o n  ? / M W h r  12.000 0 IJ.OOO 
w  n  e  r  
E n d - u - - « e r  E n d - U s e r  5 / M W h r  JO.000 S.OOO 1 0 . 0 0 0 -  : o . 0 0 0  
E q u i p m e n t  H e d u p a t c h  G e n e r a t i o n  ? / M W h r  S O  S  •?o-eo 
^ . / u t a i ^ e  t . i w n e r  





' t a r t u p  
I ' r a n . - i r n t  B u . ^  n d e r - i e e  a b o v e  s e c t i o n  o n  l o a d  i n t e r r u p t i o n  
F r r q i j c n c y  L o a d  F r e q u e n c y  
. l i p  I n t e r r u p t i o n  
G e n e r a t o r  E q u i p m e n t  C o n t r o l l e d  G e n e r a t o r  G e n e r a t i o n  S / c a - x e  S.OOO 5 0 0  4.000-6.000 
O u t  o f  a j u t a g e  i t a r t u p  O w n e r  
S t e p  R e d i J p a t c h  ; / M W h r  s o  s 40-60 
U  n c o n t r o l l e d  G e n e r a t o r  S / c a ^ e  S.OOO 0  S.OOO 
. ' t a r t u p  
R e d i . - ' p a t c h  S / M W h r  so s 40-60 
S a n c t i o n s  S / M W h r  5 0  0  5 0  
•  H e r e ,  w c  t h a t  a l l  t h e  e n d - u ^ e r ^  a r e  c o m m e r c i a l  c u j t o m e r j  
2.8 Summary 
In this chapter, the problem of impact assessment for risk calculation is addressed. 
The most important contribution of this section is that a unified common measure of 
severity is proposed as a common basis for comparison for different types of security 
problems. The comparison between rating-based and cost-based severity measures, the 
difference between impact and decision, and the issue related to uncertainty modeling 
of impact are discussed. Finally, the classification of impacts and some sample data in 
the template form are also presented. 
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CHAPTER 3 RISK ASSESSMENT FOR TRANSFORMER 
LOADING 
3.1 Introduction 
In today's competitive electric energy market environment, the incentive to heavily 
load power transformers is being driven by the need to achieve increased profits and 
the related reluctance to invest in new facilities. Hence, there is considerable interest 
in identifying decision-making criteria so that they can be fully, but safely utilized ["27. 
28]. We address this issue by describing a method for computing risk as a function of 
transformer loading. The computed risk can be used to identify individual transformer 
loading limits. It can also be used, together with risk calculation for transmission line 
overload, voltage collapse, voltage out-of-limit. and transient instability to obtain a 
composite risk as a function of operating conditions [5]. 
The condition that limits the transformer loading capabilities is the temperature of 
the winding and the insulation [*29]. This condition is characterized by the winding 
hottest-spot temperature (HST). The winding HST in the top or in the center of the 
high or low voltage winding is the worst (highest) temperature for which the trans­
former insulation system is subjected. It is a function of ambient temperature, load 
shape, and transformer characteristics. Higher winding HST causes degradation in the 
strength of the winding insulation material. High temperatures decrease the mechanical 
strength and increcise the brittleness of fibrous insulation, increasing the potential for 
transformer failure. Gas bubbles may also form which facilitate the dielectric breakdown 
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charactcrislic of the transformer oil. 
In this chapter, a risk-based probabilistic method is developed to assess transformer 
loading capability, taking into account the probabilistic nature of tirne-varying loads 
and ambient temperature. .A. sample calculation, with both component level analysis 
and system level analysis, is given. Quantitative reference risk levels are obtained based 
on reference loading levels given by lEEE/.AX.SI C'o7.115-1991. [t shous that our cjuan-
titative risk assessment is useful in a.ssessing transformer loading and in aiding related 
decision making. .An additional benefit is that it enables inclusion of transformer loading 
in composite system risk analysis. 
3.2 Literature Review 
Many studies have been done to explore the effects of high loading under the moti­
vation of loading transformer beyond the nameplate rating. Most of these studies focus 
on improving Hottest-spot temperature (HST) calculation models or developing meth­
ods for assessing the influence of transformer thermal delays on short term high loading 
[30. 31. 32. 33. 34]. .An advanced transformer diagnostic system including both software 
and hardware is described in [35]. in which transformer loss of life and coil integrity could 
be predicted based on historical data. Reference [36] provides a transformer loadability 
study by simulating transformer thermal behavior considering the correlation between 
loading profiles of the transformer and ambient-temperature profiles. References [37] 
and [38] show some economic models to provide cost-benefit analysis of transformer 
overloading capability. References [39] and [40] give some practical guidelines for over­
loading the transformer based on both industrial standard and e.xperience. .All these 
studies are based on the assumption that the ambient temperature and loading pro­
file are known: they do not take into account the probabilistic nature of time-varying 
ambient temperature and loads. 
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3.3 Method Overview 
In this section, we develop a systematic method to compute risk of transformer load­
ing ca[)ability [-11]. We treat the loads and ambient temperatures as uncertainties. .-V 
.Monte Carlo technic[ue is employed to calculate the probabilistic distribution of the 
u indiiig HST. Based on the transformer HST. we calculate loss of life and failure prob­
ability of the transformer. The total risk for the transformer is obtained by summing 
the product of probability and consec|uerice over all possible HST levels. We consider 
the consequence of a HST level in terms of loss of life and transformer dielectric failure. 
Fig. 3.1 shows this risk calculation procedure. 
3.4 Analytical Development 
In this section, we develop a risk assessment model for transformer overloading. 
Compute the Total Risk 
Compute the Risk of Loss of Life Compute the Risk of Dielcctric Failure 
Compute the Impact of Loss of Life Compute the Impact of Dielectric Failure 
Compute the Distribution of HST of Transformer 
Input Data (load profile, ambient temperature profile, etc) 
Figure 3.1 The Procedure for Transformer Risk Calculation 
3.4.1 Hottest-Spot Temperature Model 
Transfornirr insulation deteriorates as a function of time and temperature [30]. Since 
the temperature distribution in most transformers is not uniform, tlie most common 
{)ractice is to consider the aging effects produced by the winding hottest-spot tempera­
ture. We use the following method for calculating steady state and transient tempera­
ture. based on [42. -l.'L 44]. 
CJiven the transformer MV'.A loadings and the ambient temperature, the ultimate 
steady state top oil temperature rise 0^ over ambient temperature is computed as: 
where O/i is transformer top oil temperature rise over ambient temperature at "full" or 
rated load. K is the ratio of MV.-V loading to transformer nameplate rating (i.e.. the 
ratio of load current to the rated load current if the voltage is assumed constant). R 
is the ratio of loss at rated load to no-load loss, and n is the e.xponential power of loss 
versus top oil temperature rise For transient temperature calculations, the top-oil 
temperature rise over ambient after t hours is: 
where 7b is oil thermal time constant for rated load, and Oi is the initial top oil temper­
ature rise over ambient. The HST rise above top oil temperature rise will be 
where ^'g(//) is hottest-spot conductor rise over top oil temperature at rated load, m is 
the ex[)onential power of winding loss versus winding gradient -. Finally the H.ST ^hst (0 
'Typical valucii are n = 0.8 in the case of OA (self-cooled) operation: n = 0.9 in the ca«ie of 0.-V/F.\ 
(forccd-air operation). OA/F.\/FA: n = l.O in the ca.se of FO.\ (forced-oil-cooled). 0.\/F.\/F0.\. and 
OA/FO.\/FO.\ operation [42]. 
"Typical %'alues are m = 0.8 in the case of 0.\, 0.-\/F.\, 0.\/F.\/F.-V. and non-directed FO.-V. 
0.-\/F.\/F0.\. 0.-\/F0.\/F0.-V operation; m = 1.0 for directed flow FO.\ operation. [42] 
(3.1) 
(3.2) 
O g { t )  =  (3.3) 
;}2 
cjf tlic t raiisformor after t hours is 
where is the aml)ient temperature. If the initial top oil temperature is unknown, 
then it can l)e estimated based on the knowledge of 24-hour loatl cycle using the following 
iterative method. 
• Step I: .Assume an initial HST. 
• Step 2: Follow the preceding procedure to calculate the HST of each hour, including 
the HST of the 25th hour (first hour, next day). 
• Step -3: Compare the assumed initial HST with the HST of the 2.5th hour. If they 
are close enough, stop: if not. use the 25th hour HST as the initial HST. Go to 
step 1. 
Our e.xperience indicates that usually, convergence is obtained in four to five itera­
tions. 
3.4.2 Uncertainties in Hottest-Spot Temperature Model 
When using the preceding model to calculate the transformer HST. there is typically 
some uncertainty regarding loading and ambient temperature. In the following, we 
provide probabilistic models to describe these uncertainties. 
• Trrinsfot~mer Loading: Transformer daily load patterns in the future can be ob­
tained by load forecasting, but load forecasting always has errors, and this error 
can be significant in today"s deregulated environment. We assume that this un­
certainty can be described by a normal distribution with the forecasted value as 
its mean [45]. 
i.s possible to choose any other distribution ifit provides a better representation of tliis uncertainty. 
• Ainhifiit T( III pf rat lire: Similarly, for temperature uncertainty caused by weather 
forecasting error, we assume that it can also be descril)ed by a normal flistribution 
with the forecasted value as its mean [46]. 
• Correlation hftirecri Transfornifr Loading and Ambient Ttnipe red lire: It is ob­
served that loading profiles are correlated with ambient temperature profiles [36]. 
For example, winter peak loads usually occur on the coldest days of the year: while 
summer peak loads occur on the hottest days of the year. So in winter the corre­
lation between load and temperature should be negative: in summer it should be 
positive. 
3.4.3 Obtaining Probabilistic Distribution of HST 
In this section, we obtain the probabilistic distribution of transformer winding HST 
Ohst- There are generally two kinds of approaches for obtaining distributions for param­
eters that are functions of random variables: analytical and Monte Carlo simulation. 
.Monte Carlo simulations are typically more attractive than conventional analytic meth­
ods when dimensionality or model comple.xity make the analytical computation difficult. 
In this study, although either approach will work, we employ a Monte Carlo technique 
due to its mathematical simplicity and its ability to include more comple.x probabilistic 
models for the ambient temperature and transformer load. The calculation time for 
obtaining the H.ST probability distribution is not a serious concern as we can obtain 
a converged simulation result for one transformer in less than I minute on a Pentium 
266MHZ PC for a 24-hour risk calculation. 
Monte Carlo methods are bcised on the random sampling of scenarios, followed by 
the analysis of each sampled scenario [47. 4Sj. In our approach, we nuist obtain a dis­
tribution of ambient temperature and load over each hour. VVe assume this distribution 
is multivariate normal (MVN). and we generate it according to the following two steps: 
•  S t f j )  I :  Cicncratc a uni\ariate normal distribution .\(0.1). A simple srlienuMs the 
Box-Muller method [47]: 
A' = {-2ln{\\)"'-cus{-l-V,) 
Y  =  ( - - i Z / K  
where X and \ are a pair of independent random variables of X(O.l). and \ i and 
I 2 are a pair of independent random variables of uniform distribution L'(O.l). 
•  S t e p  2 :  Obtain the 2T dimensional M\ N distribution Z by the following transfor­
mation 
Z = AZo + M (3.5) 
where T is the number of hours to be studied.Z q is 2T independent N'(O.l). f.i is 
a '2T X 1 dimensional vector representing the means of the MV'N' distribution. .A 
is a 2T X 'IT matri.x which satisfies AA^ = and Y, is the covariance matri.K 
characterizing the correlation between load and temperature over T hours. 
•After sampling the ambient temperature and load in each hour, the H.ST in each 
sample is computed using the HST model described in Section 3.4.1. Finally, we need 
to represent the simulation results of HST in each hour using the density function. The 
most commonh" used nonparametric density estimator is based on the simple binomial 
distribution [49j. For a given h, we define f/. as the number of observations falling in 
the temperature interval {Ohsti — h/2. Ohst, + A natural estimator for probability 
density function which represents the hourly HST. is given by 
fiO,s,.) = - (3.6) 
n 
where n is the total number of observations. 
3.4.4 Impact of Transformer Overloading 
In our approach, we consider two impacts due to the transformer overloading: loss 
of life and dielectric failure. 
3.4.4.1 Loss of Life 
The transformer insulation deteriorates as a function of time and temperature. The 
relation of insulation deterioration to changes in time and temperature is assumed to 
follow an adaptation of .-Xrrhenius reaction rate theory as stated in the .\XSI guides 
[-12. -}3. 44]. which give the following expression for transformer insulation loss of life 
during time t: 
D { 0 )  = lOOx/ X (3 7) 
Here. D ( 0 )  is the percentage of total life lost. 0  = O H ^ T  +  27-3 is the hottest spot 
temperature in ° K, DHAT is the hottest-spot temperature in °C. and A and B are constants 
from the life expectancy curve [42]. 
If a transformer is operated within rated capacity, it could be reasonably expected 
to last in excess of 30 years if routine maintenance and testing are conducted. It is 
assumed that the "normal" loss of life are from loadings that result in a daily loss of 
life equal to that of a continuously loaded winding hottest-spot temperature Oq (110°C' 
for 6O°C rise and 9.5°C' for OO°C rise transformer, respectively "'). If the transformer 
hottest-spot temperature is higher than Oq, the aging rate of the transformer exceeds 
the normal value, which reduces the transformer working life and increases depreciation 
cost. So we consider the impact due to loss of life of thermal overloading is 
^  x C t  \ r O >  0 0  f o l m i { 0 )  =  <  (3.S) 
0 otherwise 
"'Transformers with an average winding rise of not more than 6o°C {^o°C) and hottest-spot winding 
rise of not more than 80°C (G-o'C) are referred to as Go'C (5o°C) rise transformers. 
:J6 
\vlicM<' A/ = D { 0 )  —  D ( ( ) o ) .  t o  is tliP exppcted percentage of transformer remaining life, 
and C't is llie cost of re-winding the transformer. 
3.4.4.2 Dielectric Failure 
P'or power transformers rated above lOOMV'A. there are many other stress factors 
such as mechanical (short-circuit) stresses, bushing dielectric stress, and leakage flux 
densit\'. all of which increase with transformer loading. If proper prevention measures 
are adopted, these factors are considered less severe than dielectric stress on insulation 
volume caused by the HST [42]. In this study, we only consider the risk of dielectric 
failure caused by transformer overloading It is believed that operating at insulated 
winding HST above l-40°C may cause gassing in the solid insulation and oil. Gassing 
produces a potential risk to the dielectric strength of the transformer. The test results in 
[oO] indicate that there is a gradually increasing probability of dielectric failure whenever 
normal operating temperatures are e.xceeded, and the probability of failure is significantly 
increased at temperatures above l.50°C'. 
The probability of transformer failure during the ne.xt time period [^o-'i] is 
We use the Hazard function to approximate the above probability. When Iq and ii 
are close enough, eq. 3.9 can be approximated by the following equation 
P r ( l o  < T <  ( i j T  >  l o . O )  =  //(<o|^) X A t  (3.10) 
where A t  = l i  — t o  and H { t o \ 0 )  is the Hazard function 
where /(•) is the probability density function and F(-) is the cumulative distribution 
function of dielectric failure time. 
""For cases when it is deemed necessary, risk of otiier factors mav be included as well. 
lo roiupiitc oq. 3.10. we need to know /(-) and F(-). Since Weibull Hazard plots 
have been successfully applied to analyze BP.\ transformer life data [-^1]. we assume that 
tlie Weihidl flistribution can be used to describe the probability of transformer dielcctric 
failure in its life cycle. Further, as we mentioned in Section ;i.-l.4.l. the transformer 
insulation degradation is assumed to follow the Arrhenius relationship [42], which is a 
widely used model describing the effect that temperature has on the rate of a chemical 
reaction [-19]. Therefore, we a.ssume that the thermal related failure probability of a 
transformer can l>e described by the .Arrhenius- Weibull model'' [52. 49|. which is 
m  =  ^ 0 { x )  F ( t )  =  ' ^ ( x )  (3.12) 
at 
where o(.r) = . <&(x) = I — , x = . cr jg t Jie scale parameter. // = 
f i d a  —  l o g [ A F { 0 ) ] .  / i g ^  =  1/(A:b<?o)- = 1/11605 is Boltzmann's constant in electron volt 
per °C. and .\F{0) is the .\rrhenius acceleration factor which is 
I 1 
Here. is the activation energy in electron volts (eV) of the insulation material, having 
range from 0.3 to 1.5 depending on the type of the insulation material [53]. 
catastrophic failure of a transformer results in considerable costs. When such a 
failure occurs, the event is sudden, and the consequence can be substantial particularly 
if the system is stressed. The impact associated with transformer failure includes the 
cost of replacing transformer capacity (including the cost of replacing the transformer, 
system redipatching cost, penalties, and sanctions). It can be quantified as 
I ni l — < 
Cfailure if failure 
0 otherwise 
(3.13) 
where Cf,uiurf is the cost of replacing transformer capacity due to the transformer failure. 
'This assumption could be verified e.vperimentally or by analyzing e.xisting data from industry. 
:{8 
3.4.5 Risk Calculation 
Risk has been defined as the product of probai)ility and impact [5]. The total impact 
of transformer thermal overload includes both the impact of loss of life and failure. 
I'nder a specified operating condition .\ (typically characterized by transformer loading 
in terms of current) which is a function of time t. the risk over a periofl of F is 
R l . s k i / r 7 i \ X )  =  R L s h { [ m i \ X )  - I -  R i s l c [ f m 2 \ X )  ( : M 4 )  
where /?/.s•^•(/mj.V) is the risk corresponding to the operating condition .\. The risk 
corresponding to loss of life is: 
/? / . s^•( /m^| .V)  = /"  f  P r { 0 \ X )  X  ( I  -  H { t \ e )  X  A t )  x  f m i ( O ) d 0 d t  (3.15) 
Jo Jbo 
where P r { 0 \ X )  is the probability density function of 0  given X. (I — H ( t \ 0 )  x A t  is the 
probability of no transformer dielectric failure. The risk corresponding to transformer 
dielectric failure is: 
R i s f c { [ m 2 \ X )  ^  f  f  P r { 0 \ X )  x H i t \ 0 )  x  A t  x  I m . d O d t  (3.16) 
Jo JQo 
From eq. 3.1o. we can see that the risk of loss of life is only considered when there is no 
transformer dielectric failure. 
3.5 Transformer Reference Risk Levels 
Power system load is typically cyclic in nature with both daily and annual c\cles. 
For the daily cycle, it is usually assumed that transformers operate on a load cycle that 
repeats every 2-1 hours. The load cycle changes with seasons. It is usually appropriate 
to assume that the duration of the same load cycle extends over 90 days [33]. IEEE 
Standard C57.115-1991 [42] defines four types of loadings with progressively increasing 
degrees of risk (see Section 3.5.2). In this section, we use the approach developed in 
;{9 
Section 1 to compute the risk associated with these types of loadings. We then use 
these risk levels as benchmarks on which to judge acceptability of transformer loading. 
3.5.1 Sample Data 
The sample transformer characteristics are shown in Table 3.1. [iiost of which are 
e.xtracted from Appendi.x C in The transformer is rated F0.-\. 400 with 6-5°C 
average winding ri.se. Here, the parameters are defined as in Section 4.3.1. 




G f i  36.0° C 
28.6° C 
R 4.87 
~0 3.5 h 
n 1.0 
m 0.8 
We also make the following statistical assumptions: 
• The deviation of loading profile is 10 percent of its mean. 
• The deviation of ambient temperature is 30 percent of its mean. 
• The correlation between load and ambient temperature is 0.01. 
In practice, one would obtain these values from historical data. 
3.5.2 Reference Loading Levels 
The following are four types of loading defined in IEEE Standard C57.115-1991 [42]. 
• Normal Life E.xpectancy Loading 
10 
Xormal life expectancy loading (XLF-IL) is loading for which the winding HST and 
inaxitnuin top oil temperatures permitted in lEF-E Co7.12.00-1987 [o-l] are not 
exceeded, although the loading may exceed nameplate rating. This loading can 
be continued indefinitely: it is considered to he risk-free to remain in .\LEL. lo 
remain in XLEL. it is suggested that the winding HST he kept in the range of 
110°C - r20°C. 
• Planned Loading Beyond Xameplate Rating 
Planned loading beyond nameplate rating (PLBX R) is loading for which the wind­
ing HST or top oil temperature exceeds the levels suggested for XLEL. It is ac­
cepted by the user as an anticipated, normal, reoccuring loading. This loading is 
allowed with all components in service, yet some risk is associated with. To remain 
in PLBXR. it is suggested that operation not exceed 4 hours per day when the 
winding HST is in the range of r20°C - 130°C. 
• Long-time Emergency Loading 
Long-time emergency loading (LTEL) is loading for which the winding HST or 
top oil temperature e.xceeds those permitted for rated load operation. It is usually 
allowed only under conditions of prolonged outage of some system elements. To 
remain in LTEL. it is suggested one 24-hour period contains no more than six 
hours operation when the winding HST is in the range of I30°C' - 140°C. together 
with no more than four hours operation when the winding HST is in the range of 
120° C - 130°C'. 
• Short-time Emergency Loading 
Short-time emergency loading (STEL) is loading for which the winding HST or 
top oil temperature e.xceeds the limits given for PLBNR. It is an unusually severe 
condition typically acceptable only after the occurrence of one or more unlikely 
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(•Wilts that soriously clisturl) normal system loading. To remain in STEL. it is 
suggested that one 24-hour period contain no more than one hour operation when 
the winding HST is ill the range of l.}0°r' - ISO°C'. together with no more than si.\ 
hours o[)eration when the winding HST is in the range of l-"30°C - 140°C' and no 
more than four hours operation when the winding HST is in the range of r20°C -
130°r. 
T^ihle 3.2 'provides the maximum temperature and duration limits per day for the 
above four types loading suggested in [42]. Fig. 3.2 shows an example of these four types 
of loading for a sample transformer [42]. 
Table 3.2 Limits for Different Loading 
Types Winding Top oil Duration 
HST.°C Temp.°C (per day) 
XLEL 110-120 105 24 h 
PLB.NR. 120-130 110 4h 
LTEL 120-130 110 4h 
130-140 6h 
STEL 120-130 110 4h 
130-180 Ih 
1-30-140 6h 
3.5.3 Reference Risk Levels 
Fig. 3.3 shows the risk of each hour in one day for four different types of loading ® for 
the sample transformer. It can be seen that in each day the highest risk always appears 
around the time with heaviest load. It also shows, as e.xpected. that the risk increases 
'Limits for oilier metallic HST, which refers to tiie hottest-spots temperatures of all grounded 
metallic striirtural parts wiiether in contact witli solid insulation or not. are also given in [42]. These 
limits are given because it is believed that gas evolved at other metallic hot-spots does contribute 
significant risk, especially under the condition of LTEL and STEL [oo, -56. 57]. We do not consider its 
effect in our risk calculation. 
^W'e normalize the impact by choosing the cost of replacing transformer capacity CjaUurc = 100 and 








Figure ;}.2 Four Types of Loading, in p.u. of Transformer Rating 
with increasing load. For example, the total risk for NLEL is only 0.0107 p.u.. while for 
STEL it is 0.6119 p.u.. 
3.6 Component Level Analysis 
In this section, we provide component level risk analysis to determine the transformer 
short-term loading capability and long-term loading capability. 
3.6.1 Short-term Risk Assessment 
Fig. 3.4 provides iso-risk curves. The points on each curve have the same risk value. 
For e.xample. the points on the curve NLEL have the same risk value as the loading 
profile .X'LEL. which is 0.0107 x lO"'^ p.u.. Similar curves can be drawn for other risk 
values, if desired. 
If one accepts that the risk of NLEL as the ma.ximum risk value for the next 9 hours. 
NLEL PLBNR 




Tim e( hour) 
5 10 15 20 5 10 15 20 
Time(houf) T»ne(hour) 
Figure 3.3 Risk of Different Types of Loading 
then Fig. 3.4 indicates that the continuous loading of the transformer should not exceed 
its rated value. For one hour of loading, the same risk level would allow about 2o9c 
above nameplate loading. If one accepts the risk of PLBN'R. then the transformer can 
be operated for 9 hours at 25% above nameplate loading. 
3.6.2 Cumulative Risk Assessment 
The method we developed can be used to compute cumulative transformer thermal 
risk over a specified time period. Some transformers that serve to interconnect different 
portion of a transmission system may require studying over a time interval of a year or 
more to appropriately capture the risk variation, especially when the system is subject to 
uncertain flow patterns caused by the market. However, for transformers serving cyclic 
end-user demand, a time interval of 24 hours is sufficient to capture risk variation. We 
focus on this latter case to illustrate cumulative risk calculation for transformers. 
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Figure 3.4 Short-term Loading Capability Based on Equal Risk Criterion 
loading profile, corresponding to a maximum cumulative risk. Fig. 3.5 shows the risk of 
one day with different loading profile multipliers F on NLEL. It can be used to identify-
how much additional risk is incurred as the demand grows. Conversely, it can be used to 
identify how much additional demand can be accommodated if one decide to accept an 
increased risk. For example. Table 3.3 gives the corresponding load multipliers, using 
.\'LEL as a base to maintain the same total risk as that indicated in Fig. 3.5 for each 
loading type. 
Table 3.3 Load .Multipliers 
NLEL PLBNR LTEL STEL 
F 1.00 1.25S 1.337 1.400 
Total Risk 
Risk 1 (loss of life) 
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Load  mul t ip l i e r  F  
Figure .'3.5 Risk with Different Loading Profile Multipliers 
3.7 System Level Analysis 
There are five transformers altogether in the single area model of the IEEE RTS-96 
system as shown in Appendix B [oS]. We assume all the transformers have the same 
characteristics and conditions as given in Section 3.4.1. The impact costs of replacing 
transformer capacity, which are assumed the same to each transformer, are shown in 
Table 3.4. 
The system load condition is normal winter weekdays. In order to accentuate the 
problem being studied, we modify the system by increasing the total system load to 110 
Table .3.4 Impact Evaluation for Transformer Overload 
impac t  Cta^ !< i{ ica l ion  Co . - i t  I n fo rmat ion  
Pc r fo r rnancr  Co ' i  Impac t  Co^ t  Al fec ted  t j  n i t  (Expec ted  2 t and  osVt  
Measure  Ca tcKory  Componen t  Componen t  Group  Va l  u  e  Dev .  C  I .  
Xf rn r  Equ jpmrn i  Lo . t j  Rep lacc  Transmi .^^ ion  s/cxarr 10 '  10*^  (0  8  -  1.2)  X 10*  
Cur r rn i  DarnAj^c  CI  l i f ^  x fmr  Owner  
Xfmr  Rep lace  5 / f a i lu re  10 '  lo ' "*  ( 0  8  -  1 2 )  X 10 '  
f a i lu re  x fmr  
Equ ipment  Xfmr  Red  pa tch  5 /MWhr  50  5  lO-CO 
fa i lu re  Sanc t ions  « /MWhr  SO 0  SO 
Pena l ty  A 5 /NfWhr  10 .000  0  10 .000  
Oppor tun i ty  > /MWhr  SO s  ^O-CO 
Cascade  S /ca^e  0  0  0  
16 
jn'rccnt. or 2172.-5GM\V. [-"ig. 3.6 shows the hourly loachngs of five transformers of the 
IF.KK RTS-96 system in normal winter weekdays. 
Fig. :}.7 gives the quantitative risk of each liour for these five transformers. Since 
all the transformers are loaded far below their rated value (-100 M\'A). the risk values 
of these transformers are much lower than the reference risk levels developed in Section 
1.-1..'5. But we still can observe that the transformer AT suffers the most risk of all five 
transformers since it has the highest loading level. In addition, we observe that small 
increases in loading can result in disproportionately large increases in risk, illustrated 
by comparing the hour 20 loading peak with the hour 20 risk peak. 
Fig. .'3.8 and Fig. 3.9 give the results under a very serious operating condition when 
both transformer .\16. in parallel with .AIT. and line 104-109 are outaged. Compared 
with the no outage case of figure 4.5, the total system transformer risk is increased about 
27 times, and the risk related to transformer .-\17 is §5344.33. which increa.ses about LOO 
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Figure 3.6 Hourly Load without Outage 
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Figure 3.S Hourly Load with Outage A16 and Line 104-109 
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Figure 3.9 Hourly Risk with Outage A16 and Line 104-109 
3.8 Composite Risk Analysis 
V\'c have developed methods to compute the risk of transmission line overload [6. 22]. 
voltage collapse [2-1. o9j. voltage out-of-limit [24. 59]. and transient instability [60. 61. 62] 
for defined operating conditions. Because our risk calculation for each problem type has 
the same unit. S/hr. we can add them together to get a composite evaluation of security. 
Here, we illustrate by composing transmission line overload risk with transformer over­
load risk to obtain a total system overload risk. Fig. .3.10 shows the composite overload 
risk with system loading for the IEEE RTS-96. We assume that the system load and 
generation are proportionally increased. Calculation results show that loadings of the 
five transformers increase less than the loadings of lines 114-116 and 116-117. which 
arc heavily stressed and dominate the transmission line risk. Thus, in Fig. 3.10. the 
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Figure 3.10 System Overload Risk 
Such an evaluation is useful to operators for monitoring overall system stress. In 
addition, it provides a much needed bridge between engineering reliability and market 
economics. 
3.9 Summary 
V\'c provide a risk-based assessment method of transformer thermal loading capabil­
ity. Compared with the traditional deterministic methods, this method has the following 
advantages: 
• It determines a realistic estimate of transformer thermal loading capability by 
using probabilistic characterization of uncertainty rather than using conservative 
deterministic values. 
• It provides a quantitative risk inde.x that can be used to detect high risk situations. 
oO 
• It can also be userl. together with risk calculation for transmission lines overload, 
voltage collapse, voltage out-of-limit. and transient instability to obtain a compos­
ite risk as a function of operating conditions. 
It is perceived that the risk calculation method is helpful in making decisions related to 
trading off risk against the economic benefits that may result from a transformer loading 
level. 
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CHAPTER 4 RISK ASSESSMENT FOR SPECIAL 
PROTECTION SYSTEMS 
4.1 Introduction 
The environment of competitive markets in power system is fostering an increasing 
demand for transmission services. According to the XERC s 1997-2006 reliability assess­
ment report [63, 64]. during the last ten years, most transmission system additions were 
designed to locally strengthen the network in response to demand growth or to connect 
capacity resources; few major transmission reinforcements have been made specifically 
to strengthen the bulk transmission system. Simultaneously, open transmission access 
has resulted in increjised electricity transfers over longer distances, in directions and 
magnitudes unforeseen when the current transmission systems were planned and con­
structed. Thus, the transmission system is becoming routinely stressed by increased 
electricity transfers, resulting in some transmission interfaces being frequently loaded at 
or near their security limits. Consequently, system operators and security coordinators 
are relying more on operating procedures to maintain the security of the transmission 
network. 
Special protection systems (SPS) (also called remedial action schemes or R.AS) are 
designed to detect abnormal system conditions, typically contingency-related, and initi­
ate pre-planned, corrective action to mitigate the consequence of the abnormal condition 
and provide acceptable system performance [1], SPS can provide rapid corrective actions 
and are often used to increase the transfer capability of the network. These systems are 
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sonu'tirnrs [XMToived as attractive alternatives to constructing new transmission facilities 
Ix 'cause they can lie [)lacecl in service relatively ciuickly and inexpensively [03]. atifl they 
provide that the system may be securely operated at a higher level of stress, assuming 
the SPS works properly. 
However, excessive reliance on SPS can result in increased risk. Because SPS are 
normally armed only under stressed conditions, when their failure would result in very-
severe consequences, this risk can be significant. In addition to the risk caused by 
failure to operate when required. SPS also contributes risk via unintended operation and 
unplanned interaction with other SPS. The latter risk becomes of significant concern as 
the utilization of SPS grows. 
In this section, the reliability issue of SPS is addressed. generic procedure for SPS 
risk assessment is developed. .An illustration for computing the effect of reliability of a 
Generation Rejection Scheme (GRS) to the system transient stability is also given in 
detail. 
4.2 Literature Review 
There are many types of SPS in use today: 9.i schemes and 113 special protection 
schemes were reported in operation in the 19SS CIGRE s survey [6o| and in the 1992 
lEEE-CIGRE's survey [66], respectively. Table 4.1 ' shows the percentages of the most 
commonly used SPS types identified in the 1992 lEEE-CIGRE's survey [66]. 
To complement the above information obtained via survey, we also provide similar 
information obtained from operating procedures of a North .American reliability council. 
.According to [67]. generation rejection and system separation were the most commonly 
used schemes in the VVSCC system. Table 4.2 shows the percentages of the different 
WSCC SPS t\'pes existing in 1993 [67]. 
'This table includes some continuous feedback controllers because its authors define SPS more 
broadly than is done in this study. 
ry.i 
Fable 1.1 Percentages of Most Common 
Types of SPS 
Types of SPS Percentage 
Generator Rejection 21.6 
Load Rejection lO.S 
L'nderfrequency Load Shedding 8.2 
System Separation C.3 
Turbine Valve Control 6.3 
Load Generator Rejection 4.5 
Stabilizers 4.5 
HV'DC Controls 3.6 
Out-of-Step Relaying 2.7 
Discrete Excitation Control l.S 
Dynamic Braking l.S 
Generator Runback l.S 
V'ar Compensation l.S 
Combination of Schemes 11.7 
Others 12.6 
Table 4.2 SPS in WSCC system 
Types of SPS .Vumber Percentage 
Generator Rejection 31 39.7 
System Separation 12 15.4 
Out-of-Step Relaying 5 6.4 
Load Rejection 4 5.1 
Generator Runback 3 3.9 
HVDC Controls ^ 2 2.6 
Controlled Opening of Lines 2 2.6 
Combination of Schemes 5 6.4 
Others 14 17.9 
Total 78 100 
o-l 
4.3 Reliability of SPS 
SPS is often porceivcd to be highly reliable ijecause significant redundancy is typically 
considered in the design of an SPS. Diagnostic and self-check features to detect and alarm 
when essential components fail or critical functions arc not operational are often used. 
In the ('..S.. standards exist to require that each SPS owner have an SPS maintenance 
and testing program and that the design of SPS both in terms of circuitry and physical 
arrangement should facilitate periodic testing and maintenance [1], 
More specific requirements for SPS reliability can be found in [67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 
72. 73]. For example. VVSCC Reliability Criteria for Transmission System Planning [67] 
requires that systems which rely on SPS to meet the performance levels specified by these 
criteria must ensure that the SPS are highly reliable. System studies shall be conducted 
to assess the consequence of SPS failure unless it has been satisfactorily demonstrated 
the SPS failure is not credible. Therefore, failure of planned or existing SPS will only 
be studied if the SPS failure is considered credible or if the credibility of SPS failure has 
not been established. The credibility of failure of an e.xisting SPS may be demonstrated 
by actual operating performance. 
Most of today's requirements are qualitative, rather than quantitative. This is as 
it should be. since reliability criteria must be broad enough to capture a wide range 
of situations. However, there is presently little guidance in the industry to develop, 
study and assess, and maintain SPS reliability. For example, there are formal methods 
for identif\'ing failure modes in SPS. and for quantifying their reliability, yet very few 
utilities use them as indicated by industry survey results summarized in [66]. In fact, in 
[66]. over 70 percent of utilities indicated that they had no reliability model and made no 
reliability computations. majority of the responses indicated verification of reliability 
v.as done via system monitoring with subsequent adjustments. Yet, in this approach. 
"Tliesc are both discrete controls: one is automatic restart after line faults, and the other is monopo­
lar ground return operation. 
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fl('|)<'ri(lal>ility assessment requires an operation, and since .SPS arc normally dormant 
systems, tiiis ap|)roach is not very effective in ensuring dependability. Therefore, it is 
important to develop and use formal methods to model, assess and study SPS relialiility. 
Our ol)jective in this chapter is to further motivate the need for SPS reliability analysis 
and to provide a structured framework for doing it. .A secondary objective is to identify 
some specific analysis techniques that can be used within this framework. 
4.3.1 Examples of SPS Failure 
.Vn SPS event can be classified into one of the following categories: 
• Desirable operation 
• L ndesirable operation 
• Failure to operate 
An SPS operation may be desirable or undesirable, depending on the consequence of 
the operation relative to the consequence had the SPS not operated. If the consequence 
of the operation is less severe than the consequence had the SPS not operated, the 
operation is desirable. This is the case, for e.xample. when the action of a generation 
rejection scheme trips one out of three units following a disturbance when otherwise, all 
three units would have lost synchronism. 
If the consequence of the operation is more severe than the consequence had the 
SPS not operated, the operation is undesirable. Undesirable operation may either be 
unintended, due to a hardware, software, or human error, or it can be intended (according 
to the design), but still undesirable due to a fault in the design logic. .A nuisance 
operation, when an SPS takes unnecessary action when there is no disturbance in the 
system, is an e.xample of the forms. .An e.xample of the latter is when a generator rejection 
scheme operates and trips a unit following a disturbance for which it was designed to 
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operate. l)ut had the Sf^S not operated, the plant would have been stable. This situation 
can ocrur if the disturbance is single pha.so.' to ground fault and the design criteria is 
based otdy on three phase faults. 
.\n SPS failure to operate occurs when the SPS fails to respond as designed to 
conditions for which the SPS is supposed to operate. .Vn .SPS may fail to operate as 
expected for several reasons, among which are: 
• hardware failure 
• faulty design logic 
• software failure 
• human error 
Hardware failure occurs when some physical stress exceeds the capability of one or more 
installed components. Faulty design logic may occur as a result of inappropriate or 
incomplete study procedure during the design. Software failure results from errors in 
vendor written and user written embedded, application, and utility software. The vendor 
software typically includes the operating system. I/O routines, diagnostics, application 
oriented functions and programming languages. L'ser written software failure results 
from errors in the application program, diagnostics, and user interface routines. Human 
errors can be classified according to whether they are associated with construction, 
operating, or maintenance. 
When correctly operating. SPS significantly improve system response following a 
contingency. However, the failure of SPS to accurately detect the defined conditions, 
or the failure to carry out the required pre-planned remedial action, can lead to serious 
and costly consequences. The survey by lEEE-CIGRE [66] in 1992 suggests that the 
cost of SPS failure can be very high as most of the respondents selected the highest cost 
category when asked to estimate the cost of an operational failure of SPS. 
•}/ 
Some cxaniplos of SPS failure from ( .S. XERC System Disturi)ance Rej)orts from 
U)8f) - 1998 [74] have been siinmiarized as follows. 
1. WSCC - N'ortheast/Southeast Separation Scheme - April 4. I9S8 
Scheme: System Separation 
Reason: Flaw in design (the scheme was susceptible to misoperation due to the 
short bursts of communications circuit noise) 
Consequence: I.902MW of generation was lost and 253 M\\ of load was interrupted 
2. XPCC - Hydro-Quebec - April 18-19, 1988 
Scheme: Load rejection 
Reason: Hardware failure 
Conseefiience: Systemwide blackout 
3. XPCC - Hydro-Quebec - Xov. 15. 1988 
Scheme: Load rejection 
Reason: Hardware failure 
Consequence: 3,950MVV of load was interrupted 
-1. British Columbia Hydro/TransAlta Separation - Jan. 7. 1990 
Scheme: Controlled opening of lines 
Reason: Xot armed (inadvertently) 
Consequence: It caused 230kV Cranbrook-Xelway circuit to trip on the subse­
quent swing and resulted in separation (islanding) of the eastern part of the 
BCH.A/TAL'C system from the Interconnection 
5. Garrison - Taft 500kV" Xo.l and 2 outages - -Jan. 8. 1990 
Scheme: Var Compensation (trip two 500kV' bus reactors) 
Reason: Flaw in the logic design 
(  ' o n s f  ( f i K  n e t :  It caused the unnecessary diop[)ing of generation at Hauser. Morony. 
and Kyan (119M\V) as well as the loss of customer load (2oM\V) in Helena 
6. ST:^ Idaho/S\V Wyoming Outage - Sept. 12. 1991 
Schcmt: Generator Rejection 
R f d s o n :  Hardware failure (telemetry that automatically arms this scheme was out 
of calibration) 
Con.-iequtnce: It caused the loss of a second •MokV line which led to further loss 
of transmission by ov^erload and out of step conditions 
7. Pacific .AC Intertie Separation - Nov. 17. 1991 
Scheme: System Separation 
Reason: Software failure in PG<^E R.-\S programmable logic controller caused the 
delay in initiating remedial actions (also maybe hardware failure) 
Consequence: Fail to separate VV'SCC system into two islands, but did not produce 
any severe problems (it was expected that there would be load lost and out of step 
conditions) 
S. Minnesota - Wisconsin Interface 69 kV conductor burn down - Oct. 13. 1992 
Scheme: Controlled opening of lines 
Reason: Incorrect setting 
Consequence: Two 69kV lines in the Northern States Power and Dairylanci Power 
Cooperative service burned open causing the lines to fall to ground and trip out 
9. Eastern .\1.\PP-Western M.A.IN Interface Outage. .\"ov. 6. 1997 
Scheme: Controlled opening of lines 
Reason: Flaw in design (incorrectly opened the circuit at an ampere level below 
its setting, possibly due to an unbalanced load) 
Consequence: Resulted in low voltages in the southwestern Wisconsin, eastern Iowa 
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and western Illinois (Cordova), heavy loading of [)arallel. lower voltage transmission 
systems, and a large pha.se angle across the open tie at .Arpin. 
4.3.2 Help from Existing ISA and lEC Standards 
It is likely that individual companies have documented procedures for performing 
SPS design, installation, and start-up. However, documentation of these procedures 
were not found in the literature or in publicly available documentation available on 
the Internet and elsewhere, with just a few e.Kceptions. including [68] - [73]. Vet. most 
of these are quite general and tend more towards "criteria" rather than "procedures." 
Indeed, the 1993 lEEE/CIGRE survey conducted by .Anderson and LeReverend [66] 
found that most often utility criteria for SPS contained at most general requirements 
for equipment redundancy. 
It has been found that, however, that the other industries have confronted quite sim­
ilar problems. One of them in particular is the process control industry. This industry 
is comprised of companies in the petroleum, pharmaceutical, power, chemical, pulp and 
paper, and te.\tile. and supporting areas. Often, the failure consecjuence of the various 
processes implemented can be very high, and so a great deal of attention is paid to 
standardising procedures for designing, installing, and maintaining safety instrumented 
systems (SIS). These are systems that are comprised of sensors, relays, breakers, com­
munication ecpiipment. and logic solvers that "take the process to a safe state when 
predetermined conditions are violated" [14]. The SIS ecjuipment and function are cjuite 
similar to the equipment and function of SPS in power systems. 
It has been found that there are three SIS standards in describing procedures that can 
be utilized in the design stage of SPS. These standards include IS.A S-\S4.01-1996 (includ­
ing IS.\ dTRS4.02). lEC 6150S, and lEC 61511. IS.A S.AS4.01-1996 [14]. addresses the 
application of SIS for the process industries, including integrit\' levels for electrical (E). 
electronic (E). and programmable electronic (PE) systems. These systems include elec-
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r romccliaiiiral relays, .solid state logic, prograniniahle electronic systems, motor-driven 
tirneis. solid slate relays and timers, hard-wired logic, and combinations of the above. 
IS.\-d I RS 1.02 [15] is a supporting document for IS.A .S.-\8 l.0I that provides evaluation 
approaches for SIS reliability. The focus of this document is on modeling and calculation. 
IIX' G1508 [16] provides definitions, requirements, and methods of as.sessing functional 
safety integrity levels of E/E/PE safety-related systems. It is generally based and a[)-
[>licable to all E/E/PE safety-related systems irrespective of the application. lEC draft 
Gloll [17] is a process industry sector implementation of IEC6I0OS. It is primarily 
concerned with safety instrumented systems for the process industry sector. It provides 
general framework, definitions and requirements, and guidelines on the application of 
hazard and risk analysis. 
There are three basic ideas on which these IS.A and lEC materials depend. One is 
that the potential harm or danger can be measured by risk, which is the combination 
(usually the product of) the probability of occurrence of the harm and the severity of 
the harm. .A. second basic idea is that the safety instrumented functions, which mitigate 
or prevent the harm and are therefore much like SPS. can be characterized by their 
safety integrity. This is the probability of a safety* instrumented function satisfactorily 
performing the required functions under all the stated conditions within a stated period 
of time. In the cited standards, safety integrity is quantified by a safety integrity level 
(SIL). The SIL is a discrete number. 1. 2. 3. or 4. which specifies the requirements of the 
safety instrumented functions to be allocated to the safety instrumented systems. SIL 
4 has the highest level of safety integrity, and SIL I has the lowest level. Each SIL has 
associated target failure measures, according to whether the mode of operation is low 
demand operation where frequency of demand for operation is not more than once per 
year or high demand operation where this frequency is greater than once per year. For 
low demand operation, the average probability of failure to perform the design function 
on demand should lie in the range: lOE-4 to lOE-o (SIL 4), lOIi-3 to IOE-4 (SIL 3). 
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l()F,-2 to 10 E-'} (SIL 2). arul lOE-1 to lOK-2 (SIL 1). For high cleniaiul opcralion. the 
probaiiihty of a dangerous failure per hour should lie in the range: lOL-8 to 10L-!) (SIL 
1). lOF-T to lOE-S (SIL ;}). lOE-6 to 10 E-7 (SIL 2). and lOE-o to lOE-6 (SIL 1). The 
third basic idea eniijedded in these documents is that risk and SIL are keys in showing 
how the establishment and maintenance of safety-instrumented system integrity involves 
many activities over the lifetime of the equipment. This idea is captured via use of the 
term safety life cycle, the necessary activities involved in the implementation of safety 
instrumented function(s) occurring during a period of time that starts at the concept 
phase of a project and finishes when all of the safety instrumented functions are no 
longer available for use [75]. 
4.4 Procedure for SPS Risk Assessment 
The calculation of the risks is accomplished through quantitatively assessing the 
probability and impact. In this section, a generic procedure of the SPS risk assessment 
suggested in this study is illustrated in Figure 4.1. The adopted procedure consists of 
seven main steps 
1. Collect information 
2. Identify the initiating events 
3. Identify risk cource 
4. Perform SPS reliability assessment 
o. Perform impact assessment 
G. Evaluate risk 
7. Make decision 





Identify the risk sourcc 
Perform impact assessment 
Identify the initiating events 
Perform SPS reliability assessment 
Figure 4.1 Procedure for SPS Risk .Assessment 
4.4.1 Collect Information 
overall knowledge of the physical layout of the SPS. operating logic, functions of 
each physical part, location, success criteria, embedded software information, as well as 
maintenance and test procedures, is necessary to begin the SPS reliability evaluation. 
The information about system operating conditions, human interaction procedure, and 
human reliability should also be collected. This is a crucial step for SPS risk assessment 
and it is often repeated in the future steps whenever necessary. 
4.4.2 Identify the Initiating Events 
An initiating event is usually a disturbance such as line outage, generator tripping, 
load dropping, etc. In this step, a set of initiating events needs to be identified. If the 
main objective is to compare the system risk with SPS and the system risk without SPS. 
(i:i 
otilv tlic initialing events which activate SPS need to he included. If the oijjective is to 
fonipute the system total risk with SPS. then all possil>le system disturbances nuist be 
considered. 
4.4.3 Identify the Risk Sources 
SPS is designed to mitigate the consequence of the abnormal condition after large 
flisturbances. The risk from SPS mainK- comes from following four sources (1) hardware 
failure. (2) faulty design logic. (3) software failure, and (4) human error as they are 
described in .Section 4.3.1. .Any of these sources may cause the following risks to the 
system. 
• SPS fails to respond correctly to disturbance conditions for which the SPS is 
planned to operate. 
• SPS operates during steady state conditions or in response to disturbance condi­
tions for which the SPS should not operate. 
4.4.4 Perform SPS Reliability Assessment 
In order to know availability of SPS in the future, which is critical for SPS risk as­
sessment. some methods for SPS reliability assessment must be adopted. It is suggested 
that .Markov modeling is well suited for SPS reliability assessment because its flexibility 
provides that it can account for the variety of features which are common in SPS [64]. 
Specifically. .Markov modeling can incorporate independent and common cause failures, 
partial and full repairs, maintenance, and diagnostic coverage. Most importantly, it 
provides that all of these features can be modeled cis a fimction of time. This is in con­
trast to probability methods which provide steady state results and are accurate only 
for short repair times and low failure rates [64]. The Failure Mode and Effect .Analysis 
(F.ME.A) can be used cis an initial step to identify failure modes for .Markov modeling. 
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I he following steps should he followed for SPS reliahility evaluation if the FMt-A and 
Markov modeling are used: 
• Describe the system 
Based on the information collected in step 1. a logic diagram is usually developed 
to describe the system. This diagram can help to conduct the FMEA in the ne.xt 
step. 
• Complete a system level FMEA 
In this step, all the SPS components are identified and listed. In order to simplify 
the calculation, each component can include one or several physical parts. For each 
component, all failure modes and system effects should be identified. .A component 
failure is usually defined when it cannot perform its predefined functions. 
• Develop the Markov model 
First, the system states need to be defined. They are represented by the combina­
tions of states of all system components. Markov model construction begins from 
a state in which all components are successful. This states is normally numbered 
state 0. When building the Markov model, follow the rule :~For any successful 
state, list all failure rate for all successful components [76]." 
• Simplify the Markov model 
In order to ease the calculation, some states in .Markov model can be merged [76]. 
The simple rule is: "When two states have transition rates that are identical to 
common states, those two states can be merged into one, entry rates are added. 
Exit rates remain the same." 
• Calculate the state probabilities 
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[ he Markov moclel can bo re presented I)y showing its [>rol)al)ilities in matrix form 
which is often called "transition matrix." By manipulating the transition matrix, 
the state proliabilities can lie obtained. 
4.4.5 Perform Impact Assessment 
hi this step, the consequence due to SPS failure needs to be estimated in terms 
of financial losses, i.e.. the total cost a.s.sociated with the SPS failure. The impact 
can be equipment damage, ecjuipment outage, load interruption and penalties [-5]. The 
estimation can be obtained from historical data, survey or e.xperts opinion. 
4.4.6 Calculate Risk 
In this step, the system risk which incorporates the information of reliability of SPS 
is computed. In order to compare, the system risk without SP.S should also be computed. 
4.4.7 Make Decision 
Based on the risk calculation results, the system operator can make .SPS-related 
decisions to improve system security. One of such kind of decision is when to arm the 
SPS. In present industry practice, the SPS arming point is obtained deterministically 
ba.sed on worst-case scenario regardless of arming time Sometimes it is possible that 
the probability of the worst case is so low that the system risk with SPS is higher than 
risk without SPS. In this study, risk is used to determine the arming point. 
Since risk is only the e.xpected value of impact, the variance of risk might also affect 
the decision made by the system operator. For e.xample, it is possible that two situations, 
one is corresponding to with SPS and the other is without SPS. have the same risk, but 
they have different variances of risk. The system operator, who is usually a risk-averse 
•'.\rniing time is the time duration for which GRS is e.xpected to lie armed. 
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[xTson. will fletcrmine whether to arm the SPS or not by choosing the situation with 
lower variance of risk. 
4.5 Numerical Illustration 
In this section, the previous procedure will be applied to a GELS for transient stability 
[77]. 
4.5.1 Collect Information 
The typical power plant in which a GRS is installed features high generation capacity 
and multiple generation units, interconnected to the system by two or more transmis­
sion lines. Without GRS. disturbances resulting in decreased transmission capacity may-
cause an out of step condition at the plant during high loading conditions. .\ny circuit 
that initiates GRS action during a forced outage condition is defined as a critical circuit. 
.A properly designed GRS. activated by outage of any critical circuit, will trip a limited 
amount of generation at the plant in order to avoid out of step conditions for the re­
maining units [7S]-[So]. Figure 4.2 shows a portion of the IEEE Reliability Test System 
[oS] together with an illustration of the GRS logic. Line 12-13 and line 13-23 are critical 
lines. Without GRS. outage of either of these two outlet transmission lines may result 
in a plant-out-of-step condition. To improve the transient stability performance of this 
plant, a GRS is installed. When the GRS detects a line outage on either of these two 
lines, it trips promptly only one generator to keep the other two generators in service. 
The GRS logic is simple: when there is a fault on a critical line, the breakers on this line 
open; an "open" signal (high level signal) from any breaker energizes the output of the 
OR gate. The high level signal from the OR gate output, together with the high level 
arming signal, sets the .\.\'D gate output in high level, which is input to the 2 out of 3 
voting scheme. When two or more of the voting scheme input signals are high signals. 
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the votinsf schrinc output signal is high; otherwise, it is low. The high level signal from 
the voting scheme will trip the selected generator. Here, it is assumed that breakers and 
the voting scheme are fully reliable. Breakers are e.xternal to GR.S: so assuming they are 
100'/ reliable helps to isolate the CRS influence. Their failure potential can be include<l 















Figure 4.2 GRS Logic Circuit and Voting Scheme 
In the rest part of this section, the following nomenclature is used: 
• F,: event that there is a fault on circuit i. 
• A: fault type random variable. One phase to ground, two pha^e to ground, three 
pha^e to ground and phase to phase fault are defined to be represented by 1. 2. 3. 
-1. respectively, as all possible values of A. 
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• .V..: iiitinhtM- of critical circuits. 
• Xj' total ruimber of events considered in the study. 
• n.U: the .A.\'D and OR operators, resfiectively. 
• initiating events. I he first .V^-outage events correspond to "X-l outages, i.e.. 
E. = F, n F-, • • • F,_, n F. n - F.v, / = 1. - - - . .V, 
and the Nc + 1 outage event is no fault, i.e. 
= Fi n F, n • • - n F.v^ 
Outage events F,, i  > .V'c + I correspond to simultaneous outage of two or more 
circuits. Note that normally, .\V < A'c + 1-
• A": transient instability event. 
• 2L- pre-contingency operating point: it is a vector of critical precontingency con­
trollable parameters which significantly influence the post-contingency system per­
formance. In this work, generation level is considered as the only critical pre­
contingency parameter: thus. .K is used instead of X 
• T: GRS tripping event. 
• Ri.sfc{-).Im{-).Pr{-): risk, impact, and probability, respectively, of an event. 
4.5.2 Identify the Initiating Events 
There are two basic events. Fj. loss of line 12-13, F>. loss of line 23-13. So there are 
total four initiating events: Fi, loss of line 12-13: F2. loss of line 23-13: F3. no outage: 
69 
loss of both lines. may occur in any of 4 different ways. n= 1.2.3.-1. corresponding 
to tlie fonr basic fault types: one phase to ground faults, two phase to ground faults, 
three phase to ground faults, pha.se to phase faults. 
4.5.3 Identify the Risk Sources 
-A CiRS is designed to trip some pre-selected generating unit(s) at a plant in order to 
pre\ent bhickout of the entire plant. This action instantaneously reduces the electrical 
power input to the transmission s\ stem following the occurrence of specified contingen­
cies. In this example the source of risk is assumed only from hardware failure. Each 
operation of a GRS is classified into one of the following categories: 
1. The GRS trips when a contingency occurs {T H i  = 1.2. ••• ..\c--\c + 
2. • • • .At" 
2. The GRS does not trip when a contingency occurs (TDE",). i  = 1.2. • •  - .  -Vc + 
2. • • • . -Vt" 
3. The GRS trips when there is no contingency [T fl 
1. The GRS does not trip when there is no contingency {T fl 
According to these categories, the risk for a system with a GR.S comes from three sources: 
1. If a GRS fails to take corrective measures when armed and initiated, the plant 
may or may not e.xperience an out of step condition, depending on the pre-fault 
operating condition, and the fault type and location. The probability of an out 
of step condition, given occurrence of an initiating event, fault type, operating 
conditions, and GRS failure can be determined as described in [5. 62]. 
2. If a GRS takes action promptly and correctly as designed, system stability will 
be maintained, but non-zero impact will occur via a controlled trip of a block of 
generation capacity. 
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'•]. If a cuts takes an unnecessary action when there is no outage for a critical Une. 
then non-zero impact occurs via a controlled trip of a block of generation ca[)acity. 
This is a nuisance trip. 
The risk of an event / = 1.2 which causes either CJR.S trip T or instability I\. is 
U T ) / X ) .  For simplicity, the dependence on X is dropped, leaving the reader 
to be cognizant of it in what follows. Thus, the risk is 
•'''V 
Riski KuT) = E,) (4.1) 
1=1 
St 
= ^ ^  Pr(/v' n F n Et)im{ K r\T r\ Ei) 
1=1 
+  ^ P r { T r \  E , ) [ m { T n  E , )  
1 = 1  
Here the first term e.\presses the risk form source 1. and the second term e.xpresses the 
risk from source 2 and 3. 
The probability of the CRS failure to trip, T. resulting in instability I\. is denoted 
as Pr{I\ DT n Ei). Since E, occurs in any of 4 different ways, probability term can be 
expanded as follows 
I 
P r { K n t n E , )  =  Y i  /v' n f n E i  n (.-i = n)) (4.2) 
n= I 
I 
= ^ Pr(f n E. n (.4 = n)) 
n = I 
X Pr{ f\ /{T n £•,- n (.4 = n) ) )  
4 
= E i )  X P r ( { A  =  n ) / ( f n  E , ) )  
n=l 
x P r { K / { T n  E .  n ( . 4  =  n ) ) )  
riie term P r { { A  =  n ) / { T  fl E , ) )  is the probability that, given a fault, it is of type n. 
r i i i s  p r o b a b i l i t y  i s  o b t a i n e d  f r o m  h i s t o r i c a l  d a t a .  T h e  t e r m  P r ( h ' / { T  f l  E i  f l  ( . - I  =  u ) ) )  
is the probability of instability given a fault of type n. outage E,. and GRS failure to 
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trip at an operating condition X. Tliis term depends on the probability function used 
to model the distribution of fault location along the circuit associated with E,. The 
remaining terms Pr{T H £",) in eq. 4.1 and Pr(T H E,) in eq. -1.2 are the probabilities 
of CiRS success and failure, respectively, and will be addressed in Step .5. 
4.5.4 Perform SPS reliability evaluation 
• Dfscribc the system 
The logic diagram has been already developed as Figure 4.2. Corresponding four 
initiating events, there are four GRS input events as shown in Table 4.3. 
Table 4.3 Event Input Mapping Table 
Signals to GRS Logic 
Event /i I2 h ^4 Probability 
El 1 1 0  0  V { E i )  =  V { F , ) V { F . )  
E2 0 0 1 I V { E 2 ) = V { F i)V{F2) 
Es 0 0 0 0 V { E ^ )  =  V ( F , ) V { F 2 )  
1 1 1  1  V { E ^ ) = V { F , ) V { F . )  
•  Complete a sijstem level FMEA 
System states are represented by the combinations of states of all the GRS com­
ponents. Given defined modes, e.g.. 
— 0—normal mode 1 
— 1—failure mode 1 
— 2—failure mode 2 
The .AND and OR gates have the following two failure modes: 
— 1 - the output of the component is "'stuck" to 1. 
— 2 - the output of the component is "stuck" to 0. 
Table 1.1 FMKA List for The fllustrative System 
Failure Mode and Effect .-\nalysis(FME.\) 
coinpoiient failure mode failure effect failure rale(per day) 
OR 1 constant I A, = o.ooo;V;i6o 
OR 2 constant 0 A, = 0.02/365 
.\.\D 1 1 constant I A3 = 0.0003/:{6o 
.\.\D 2 constant 0 A., = 0.02/3fio 
Thus, the FMEA as shown in Table -1.4. which also shows the assumed failure 
rates, is created. 
Develop the Markov Model 
Four digits did2d3d.i are used to code the state of system. The digit di represents 
the state of component OR (0-norrnal. 1-failure mode 1. 2-failure mode 2). Digit 
d,. f/.j- d.i represent the state of the three component .AXDs (0-normal. 1-failure 
mode 1. 2-failure mode 2). By this definition, the following SI states all together 
are obtained. 
0000 0001 0010 0100 0002 0020 0200 1000 2000 
0011 0101 0110 0021 0201 0012 0102 0210 0120 
1001 1010 1100 2001 2010 2100 0022 0202 0220 
1002 1020 1200 2002 2020 2200 0111 0211 0121 
0112 1011 1101 1110 2011 2101 2110 0221 0212 
0122 1021 1201 1012 1102 1210 1120 2021 2201 
2012 2102 2210 2120 0222 1022 1202 1220 2022 
2202 2220 1111 2111 1211 1121 1112 2211 2121 
2112 1221 1212 1122 2212 2122 2221 1222 2222 
In order to reduce the dimension of the transition matri.K. the number of system 
states can be reduced by merging some states cis the three .ANDs play the same 
role in the system. The criterion is: states that have identical di and the same 
7:i 
coniI>inatioiis of cl,. d:\ and d.\ are roiisiden-fl to he the same state and rnergetl. As 
a result, the number of states is reduced to :{0. according to the following text. 
SO-0000 Sl-0001. 0010. 0100 
S2-0002. 00-20. 0200 83-1000 
S-1-2000 So-OOll. 0101. 0110 
S6-0021. 0201. 0012. 0102 ST-lOOl. 1010. 1100 
0210.0120 
S.S-2001. 2010. 2100 S9-0022. 0202. 0220 
S10-1002. 1020. 1200 Si 1-2002. 2020. 2200 
Sr2-0111 813-0211.0121.0112 
SM-lOll. 1101. 1110 815-2011. 2101. 2110 
SlG-0221. 0212. 0122 817-1021. 1201. 1012. 1102 
1210 . 1120 
8lS-2021. 2201.2012.2102 819-0222 
2210. 2120 
820-1022. 1202. 1220 821-2022. 2202. 2220 
822-1111 823-2111 
824 -1211. 1121. 1112 825-2211,2121.2112 
826-1221. 1212. 1122 827-2212. 2122. 2221 
828-1222 829-2222 
Here. 5' = 50. .91 S n  represent a state space of the GRS. where S j  is a set of 
mutually e.vclusive and e.vhaustive states. Further, each of the above states can 
be classified into one of the following C'l. C2. C'3 and C.| categories based on the 
response of each system state to system input events. 
— C'l — If the input is an active signal, then the GRS trips successfully: if the 
input is an inactive signal; then the GRS has a nuisance trip. 
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— C'y ~~ If llic input is an active signal, then the CIRS trips successfully: if tli(^ 
input is an inactive signal, then the CiR.S does not trip. 
— C'-j — If the input is an active signal, then the CIRS fails to trip; if the input 
is an inactive signal: then the GRS has a nuisance trip. 
— C.\ — If the input is an active signal, then the GRS fails to trip: if the input 
is an inactive signal, then the GR.S does not trip. 
For e.xample. S3 and So are both in C\  because when the GRS is in state S3 or So. 
the GRS trips successfully if the input is an active signal, and it has a nuisance 
trip if the input is an inactive signal. Similar thinking leads to the following: 
C\  -  S3. S5. S7. SIO. 512. S13. Sl4. S15. S17. S22. S23. S24. S25. 
C, - SO. SI. S2. S6. 
C'z - None. 
C, -  SA.  SS. S9. Sll. S16. S18. S19. S20. S21. S26. S27. S28. S29. 
Figure 4.3 shows the preliminary Markov model for our GRS. 
•  S i m p l i f y  t h e  M a r k o v  m o d e l  
The following two concepts are used: 
— .\ transition state is a state that has non-zero entry transition probability 
from other state(s) and non zero exit transition probability to other state(s). 
— An absorbing state is a state that has a 1.0 transition probability to itself. 
Then the reduction steps are as follows: 
1. Merge absorbing state belonging to the same class. Entry transition proba­
bilities are added. 
I  o 
Figure 4.3 The Preliminary Markov Model for The GRS 
2. For each absorbing state, eliminate all preceding states that a) are in the same 
class Cj as the absorbing state: b) have only one exit transition probability. 
.A.dd the entry probabilities as the entry probabilities to the absorbing states. 
3. Merge all transition states in the same clci.ss Cj that have identical transi­
tion probabilities to common states. Entry probabilities are added. E.xit 
probabilities reniciin the same. 
Following the above reduction steps,the final reduction result is shown in Figure 
4.4. 
•  C a l c u l a t e  t h e  s t a t e  p r o b a b i l i t i e s  
.Assume that the failure of the GRS components has approximately an exponential 
distribution. Therefore the pdf of component failure is /(/) = Ae~'^' . where A is 
•'Detailed description of these reduction procedures can be found in [-5]. 
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S5 
Figure 4.4 The Final Simplification Result 
the failure rate per unit time interval. Then the probability that the component 
fails before time t is 
F(0 = f X e - ^ ' d l  =  I - e-" s; \ t  
J o  
where the approximation improves as X t  gets small. With this model, a « + 1 by 
n + 1 transition matri.x B are obtained, where = 0. I n . f c  = 0.1 n )  
indicates the probability that the system transfers from state S i  to S f c .  and n  
stands for the number of states. 
Assume the probability list at initial time t  =  Iq  is 
=  { P r { S O ' { t o ) ]  P r { S n ' { l o ) ) )  
after m time intervals, the probability list is 
P r i S n ' i t ^ ) ) )  =  Pr'°> x B " "  
riic in the probability list P/-'"' provide the [)robability that system is in 
slate S j '  after t n  time intervals. Then 
P r { C \ )  =  ^ P r ( . s 7 ' )  S i ' e C i  
P r { C , )  =  ^ P r i S i ' )  S i ' e  0 - 2  
Pr(Cj) = ^Pr(5/') Si'eC:, 
P r ( C , )  =  ^ P r { S i ' )  S i ' e c \  
By defining the following terms. 
Pi = I — Ai — A2 - 3 A3 -3A 
P2 = I — Ai — A2 - 2A3 - 2A 
P-i = 1 - 3A3 -  3A, 
Pi = 1 — Ai — A2 — A3 " - A.i 
P5 = 1 - 2A3 -- 2A., 
Pa = I — A3 — A-i 
riic following the state transition matrix is ol)tainccl. 
/ Pi 3A:, 3A, A, Aj 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 P2 0 0 0 2Ar5 2A, Ai A, 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 P2 0 0 0 2A3 0 0 2A, Ai Aj 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 3A3 0 0 3A, 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 P3 0 0 0 3A3 0 0 3A, 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 I 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 A3 Pi 0 0 A4 0 0 Ai A2 
0 0 0 0 0 2A3 0 Ps 0 0 0 0 2A, 0 
0 0 0 0 0 2A3 0 0 P5 0 0 0 0 T 
-
c 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2A, Po 0 2A3 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2A., 0 Pn 0 2A3 
0 0 0 0 0 A3 0 0 0 A^ 0 0 Pe 0 
0 0 0 0 0 A3 0 0 0 A., 0 0 0 P6 
P r { S i { l o ) )  provides the probability that the system is in state j at time t  =  Iq .  
Assume that at initial time t = Iq. every component is in perfect condition due to 
inspection or maintenance. Therefore 
Pr<°) =  i P r { S O { t o l )  P r i S l i t o ) )  Pr(.S'l;5(/o))) 
= ( 1 0  0 )  
After m time intervals from initial time t  = Iq .  the probability list is 
P r i m )  ^  ( P r i S O i t m ) )  P r i S l i t ^ ) )  Pr(5l3(/^))) (4.3) 
= X B"" (4.4) 
Therefore, the elements in the probability list provide the probability that 
system is in state Sj after 365 time intervals, i.e.. one year, because the time interval 
7!) 
is chosen to he one clay. Substituting the F.\IF--.\ data in lahh" f I into eq. 1. 1 gives 
p,.{365) ^ p,.(0) ^ 
= (9.2200c - 01 S.:iS45f - 01 .")..5S96f - 02 
2.79-lSe-04 l.S6;{2f- 02 2.C3S;k - 07 
3.;{792e - Go 2..5;M-lc - 07 1.6S96t - 0") 
l.lo74e — 03 l.6S96e — Oo l.r26-le — 03 
l.0LS6e- 08 6.7907e - 07) 
.Since S3. So. S7. SlO. 812 constitute Ci- SO. SI. S2. S6 constitute category €'>• 
and S4. SS. S9, Sll. S13 constitute C4. then 
P r { C i )  =  Pr(.s'3) + P r { S o )  +  P r { S 7 )  +  P r { S [ 0 )  +  P r { S V 2 )  
= 2.9691e-04 
P r i C - , )  =  P r ( S O )  +  P r { S \ )  +  P r { S 2 )  +  P r { S 6 )  
= 9.7S77e - 01 
Pr(C3) = 0 
P r { C . i )  =  P r i S A )  +  P r { S S )  +  P r { S 9 )  +  P r { S n )  
+ Pr(513) = 2.0933e - 02 
4.5.5 Perform Impact Assessment 
The impact associated with GRS failure to trip. T .  possibly resulting in instability 
K. is denoted as Im{I\ (IT r\ Ei). This includes redispatch costs and startup costs. The 
impact associated with GRS trip. T. is denoted by Im{T n £,). This impact, although 
it does not include an instability event, is nonetheless non-zero because a unit does in 
fact trip. However, whereas instability causes loss of an entire plant, a controlled trip 
typically includes only 1 unit. Therefore, the impact of a controlled trip is usually much 
less than the impact of an instability. 
so 
In this study, it is a.ssunird that tluoc :ioO M\\ units at Bus wouhl be out of 
scMx irc for 10 hours in the event of transient instaiiility; ijut when a unit trips thie to 
successful CiRS operation, it is estimated that the unit is out of services for •{ hours. 
[ he costs of replacing energy and startup arc estimated in Table -I.-t. It is also assumed 
that there is no cost relate<l to transient voltage dip and freciuency dip. 
Table 4.-5 Impact Evaluation for Dynamic Insecurity 
Impact  Cla-9j t t icai ion Co«t  Information 
F 'Tforrn .»nce Co-i  Impact  Co--«t  Atfectecl  L 'ni t  Expected 2; t  a  n cl .  3^% 
McAJurc Calenory Component  Component  Group Value Dev C.I .  
Cirncrator  Equipment  Control led CJenerator  Generat ion i / cx i e  • i .OOO o o t .OOO-C.OOO 
Out  of  Outaf^e s tar tup Owner 
£tcp Rei i tJpatch $/MWhr CO 0 40.60 
opportuni t ) '  j /MWhf oo s 40-C0 
co^t  
4.5.6 Calculate Risk 
First, an approach needs to be developed for computing P r ( T  Pi E,) and P r { T  Pi £",) 
for use in eqs. 4.1 and 4.2. 
Since .s' = 5'0. 5T..... represent a state space of the GR.S. where S j  is a set of 
mutually e.xclusive and e.xhaustive states, then 
Pr(E. nr )  = Pr((£', n r) n (50 U 51 U ... U 
n 
= P r { E ,  n r  n  S j )  
j=0 
n 
=  Y , P r i T I [ E . n S j ) ) P r { E , r \ S j )  
j=0 
Since event £", is independent of S j .  that is. the occurrence of a fault is independent of 
the state of the GRS. then 
P r {  E, n S j )  =  P r {  E , )  P t {  S j )  
Hence. 
a 
P r ( E , f \ T )  =  Y , P r { T I { E , r \ S j ) ) P r { E . ) P r{ S j )  (4.o) 
aiiu 
Pr(E, n f )  = ^ Pr(f/(E. n S j ) ) P r { E , ) P r { S j ]  (-1.6) 
JZZU 
.Since Fi. F>. - • • . Fx^ arc incle[)endent of eacli other, by a.s.suming that fault process 
on a circuit is a homogeneous Poisson process and the failure rate of circuit i is A,, the 
prol)ability Pr(Ei) is obtained as follows. 
P r { E , )  =  P r i F , ) l l P r { F , )  
= (1 — e~'^' (4.7) 
These four classes comprise another state space of the GRS where the original states 
S j ( j  =  0. I n )  have been condensed to C j { j  = 1.2.3.4). Based on this state space. 
the following is obtained 
I 
ind 
Pr(E, n D = 53 Pr(r/(E, n C , ) ) P r { E , ) P r { C , )  
j=i 




Each basic input event E, belongs to a group either active (denoted as .AC) or 
inactive (denoted as A C ) .  The active input is the input that triggers GRS to trip, and 
the inactive input is the input that does not activate tripping. Given basic input event 
E, and Cj. the system output event is completely determined. Therefore, the conditional 
probability term in eqs. 4.S and 4.9 is 0 or 1 as e.xpressed bellows. 
E, G AC => { 
P r { T / { E , n C , ) ) ^  












1 . 2  
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£•. C AC =» 
P r { T I { E , r \ C j ) )  =  
P r ( T / i E ,  n C'j)) = 
1 j  =  l.:{ 
0 J = 2.4 
1 J = 2 . [  
0 J = \.:i 
Assume failure rates on both lines are A = l.oSc — o o a f a g c / h o i u '  so 
Pr(F,) = l-e 
= I — e 
-A 
—1.58X I0~ '  4.5799 X 10"°^' =1.2 
P r { E i )  =  P r i E - , )  =  P r { F i ) P r { F 2 )  
= (1 _ ^-1.3SX 10-5 58X10-^ _ ^ ^ ^^_05 
P r i E s )  = P r { F i ) P r { F 2 )  =  
% 9.9991e-01 
P r { E 4 )  =  P { F i)P{F2) = {]. -
% 2.09Se - 09 
riuis. the probabilities P r [ T  H £',) and P r { T  H £",) , required in eqs. 4.1 and 4.2. are 
shown in Table 4.6. 
Xow the risk of transient instability with GRS can be computed. Let Pgl, Pg2 and 
Pg3 represent the generation of unit 1. unit 2 and unit 3 respectively, and assuming all 
three units are generating 60% capacity (210MVV' each), then 
1. El n T: fault, clear line 1. trip I unit for 3 hrs 
f m ( E i  n T )  =  l o O P g l  + 5.000 = S36.500 
•'\\V' use I hour a s  the lime unit for the risk calculation since at operation level, one hour is a 
rea.soiiable time frame for decision niaking. 
Table l.(i The Probability Reciuirofl in ecis. 4 . 1  a n d  4.2 
P r ( E i  n T )  = Pr(£-,)[Pr(C,) + /V(C'.,)] = 4.4S;}S( — 05 
P r ( E i  n T )  = P r ( E i ) [ P r ( C : , )  +  P r ( C U ) ]  =  9.o8fi9f - 07 
P r i E y n T )  = P r { E > ) [ P r ( C i )  +  P r { C , ) ]  =  4.483.Sf — 05 
P r i E i  n 7") - P r { E z ) [ P r [ C : , )  +  P r [ C , ) ]  =  9.5SG9f - 07 
Pr(E3n F) = P r [ E : i ) [ P r [ C i ] ^  P r i C : , ) ]  =  2.9()88e - 04 
Pr(E3n T) - P r { E : , ) [ P r [ C > )  +  P r { C , ) ]  =  9.99()lc - 01 
P r { E j i n r )  = P r { E , ) [ P r { C i )  +  P r ( C 2 ) ]  =  2.0o36e - 09 
Pr(F., n r )  = Pr{E.i)[Pr{C:,)+ Pr{C,)\^ 4.3909c - 11 
'2. El n T: fault, clear line I. fail to trip, lose plant for 10 hrs 
[ m {  E i O f n  K )  =  oOO( P g l  +  P g l  + + 15.000 = S330.000 
f m { E i  n T n  f \ )  =  so 
3. E t  n T :  fault, clear line 2. trip 1 unit for 3 hrs (same as 1) 
I m l E ' z  r \  T )  =  l o O P g l  + 5,000 = S36.500 
4. E l  ( I  T :  fault, clear line 2, fail to trip. loss plant for 10 hrs (same as 2) 
f m { E - >  n T n  k ' )  =  500( P g l  +  P g 2  +  P g i i )  + 15.000 = S330. 000 
/m( £*2 n F n/v') = so 
5. £"3 n r: no fault, no line clear, trip 1 unit for 3 hrs clue to GRS nuisance trip (same 
as 1 and 3. if line re-energization cost is negligible) 
I m i E s  n D =  l o O P g l  + 5.000 = S36. 500 
6. E:inT: no fault, no line clear, no trip 
f m i E s n  T )  =  SO 
7. Eii fault, clear line I and 2. loss plant for 10 hrs. 
f m { E . i )  =  o O O { P g l  +  P g 2  +  P g S )  + 15.000 = S330.000 
S-1 
I roin of[. 1.2. we have 
I  
r r{  K  n f n E,) = ^ Pr[ t  n E,) x Pr((.-i = n)/(r n £',)) 
rl=l 
X Pt{  k / (r n £", n (.1 = //))) 
= y.o869e — 07 X 
(0.8 X  Pr(/v7( f n  £ • ,  n  (.1 = I)) 
+0.1-5 X P r { l < l [ f  n £'i n (.1 = 2)) 
+0.0O X P r { i < [ [ f  n E, n .4 = 3)) 
+0 X Pr(/v7(fn El n .4 = 4))) 
When the generation level is 210 MW. the following probabilities are obtained by per­
forming time domain simulations of the specified fault type at v^arious location along the 
circuit [62]. 
Pr(/v7( fn  E, n (.4 = I)) = 0 
Pr( K/(f n E, n (.4 = 2)) = 2.3256c - 01 
Pr(/v7(f n El n (.4 = 3)) = S.1395e - 01 
Pr(/v7(f n E, n (.4 = 4)) = 0 
Thus. 
Pr( A' n f n E.) = 7.24o9e - OS 
From eci- 4.1, we have 
R i s k [ E i )  =  R i s k { T  n  E l )  +  R i s k { I \  O  T  D  E i )  
= Pr{ A' n T  n E \ ) l m { i \  r \  T  n Ei)  
+  P r { T  n  E i ) I m { T n  El) 
= 330000 X  7.2459e - OS + 4.4S3Se - Oo x 36500 
= SI.6605 
lilarly. - -S1.6()0o./?/sA(/i':5) = $10.8:501. and Ri.<k(E.i) = §G.!)218f -01. 
us. the total risk at generation level 210M\\ i.s 
4.5.7 Make Decision 
Here, the following two approaches for decision making are provided. 
• -Make decision only based on e.xpected risk 
In present industry practice, the GRS arming point is obtained deterministically 
based on worst-case scenario regardless of arming time. The three phase fault is 
the most severe fault, but due to the rarity of its occurrence, its influence on risk 
may be less than the influence of other fault types. Therefore the deterministic 
arming point which is obtained only considering the three phase fault is not always 
equal to the probabilistic arming point which accounts for the influence from all 
four types of faults. The RBS.-\ criteria for identifying the optimal arming point 
is : "arm to minimize risk." Therefore, if we plot risk vs. generation level for 
GRS unarmed and GRS armed, the optimal arming point is when the two curves 
cross. In other words, for generation levels operating below the arming point, risk 
with armed GRS is larger than risk with GRS not armed, and for generation levels 
above the arming point, risk with armed GRS is smaller than risk with GRS not 







^ ^  Pr( I \  C i  T  n  E i ) I n i {  I \  C i T  f \  E i )  
1=1 
3  
- f -  ^  ^  P r { T  n E i ) I m { T  n E , )  
+  P r { E . , ) I m { E . , )  
S6 
Assuming that the probability of CRS t ripping event is zero, according to eq. -1.10. 
\vc can obtain the e.\pression for the system without GR-S as follous: 
=  ^  '  P r { I \  f \  E l ) ! n t (  f \  n  E , )  
1=1 
+  P r { E . x ) l T n { E . x )  
Based on eqs. 4.10 and 4.11. we obtain Figure 4.-5. Without GRS. when 
the generation level is below the deterministic limit of 610 M\V. the system risk 
results only from Risk{E.\). which indicates simultaneous loss of line 12-13 and 
23-13. Thus the risk value is very small. .As the generation level increases beyond 
6I0.\I\V. the system begins to incur risk from three phase fault, two phase faults, 
line to line faults, and one phase faults, successively. For e.xaniple. the steep 
portion of the curve corresponds to the generation level for which one phase faults 
are stable or not depending on where on the line they occur. The high slope is 
due to the fact that one phase faults are most likely. The gradual increase in the 
without-GRS curve for generation levels above 66SM\V and in the \vith-GR.S curve 
for all generation levels is caused by the increased economic impact associated with 
losing an increasingly larger amount of generation. Finally, when the generation 
level is above 66SM\V. any type of fault located anywhere on either line will cause 
instability and contribute risk. 
figure 4.5 shows that the generation level 66I.0MVV (Pgl = Pg2 = Pg3 = 
220.oMW. point 2) is the optimal arming point based on the e.xpect value of 
risk, while using the worst-case scenario (three phase fault at Bus 13) gives us the 
arming point 610MW (Pgl = Pg2 = Pg3 = 203MVV. point 1). By arming the GRS 
at the generation level 610MVV'. the system risk is actually increased by Sl3.72/hr. 




• }  
can uinuTcssarily increase risk. On the other hand, when the CiR.S is armed at the 
generation level iSOO MVV (PgI = Pg2=Pg-}="267M\\ ). the system risk is decreased 
l)y sl9.S2/hr. which could be subsequently used as an indication of worth to the 
system of operating a GRS. 
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Figure 4.5 Determination of Optimal Arming Point 
Make decision based on both e.xpected risk and its variance 
The above decision is only based on the expected value of risk. Figure 4.6 gives 
the standard deviation (S.D.) of system risk with GRS and without GRS. The 
method for computing the variance is described in .Appendix C. It shows before 
generation level 627MVV (Pgl= Pg2 = Pg3 = 209MVV. point .}). both the expected 
value and the variance of risk without GRS are smaller than those with GRS. while 
between generation level 627MV\' (point li) and generation level 661.5 .\iVV point 
2. expected value of risk without GRS is smaller than that of with GRS. but the 
variance of risk without GRS is larger than that with GRS: finally, after generation 
level 661.5MW (point 2). both the expected value and the variance of risk without 
ss  
(lUS aro larger than those with CIRS. Thus, tiie points hetwoon generation level 
G27.M\\' ([)oint 3) and generation level 661.oMW (point 2) are all Parelo efficient 
[joints, which means one cannot find a point that, when with CRS. has both smaller 
exjx'cted value of risk and variance than those without GfiS. or vice versa. The 
system operator s subjective preference to the risk and variance will determine the 
generation level to arm the GR.S among these points. 
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Figure 4.6 Variance of Risk With and Without GRS 
4.6 Summary 
In this chapter, the issue of risk brought by using special protection systems (SPS) 
is raised. .A generic procedure is developed for risk based assessment of SPS. .A relia-
bilit}' assessment procedure using F.ME.A and Markov techniques is also presented. To 
illustrate the proposed approaches, an example, using a portion of the IEEE reliability 
test system together with an illustration of the GRS logic, is provided to show how to 
calculate GRS reliability and how to integrate the influence of GR.S reliability into the 
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ii.sk-l>asecl security assessment. It is believed that risk based assessment of SPS is useful 
for various decision making problems. Our illustration of CIRS arming level identification 
shows one of these problems. Others include monitoring of total, composite system risk 
and [>roviding a price signal for operational decisions affecting security. .\s .SPS continue 
to proliferate, it seems that their reliability will become more difficult to ensure. The 
generic procedure proposed in this paper offers a step toward addressing this problem. 
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CHAPTER 5 RISK ASSESSMENT FOR BILATERAL 
TRANSACTIONS 
5.1 Introduction 
In this section, a risk based approach is developed to assess security of multiple 
simultaneous transactions. The system risk considered in this study includes transmis­
sion line overload risk, transformer overload risk, and bus voltage out-of-limit risk. The 
approach computes the risk brought by each transaction by comparing the system risk 
change with and without the transaction. .-V probabilistic load flow and component risk 
functions are used to assess the system risk. The proposed approach takes full ad%antage 
of risk based security assessment by considering power system ambient and operating 
uncertainties [o]. .A. basic theme underpinning this chapter is that the risk inde.x can 
be regarded as a security cost caused by the transaction to system. The price of each 
transaction should reflect this cost. It also might be used to deal with another important 
issue - transmission congestion management in a deregulated environment [S6]. 
5.2 Literature Review 
In this section, a literature review of some related work is provided. 
f ) l  
5.2.1 Power System Transaction Analysis 
With the ra|>iclly increasing nuriilier of transactions, transaction analysis in cleregu-
latc'cl power system is becoming an important issue [87. SS. 89. 90. 91. 92. 93]. Currently, 
the research about the impact brought by power transactions to transmission system 
mainly focus on two area^: transmission service cost allocation and security assessment. 
Transmission services cost allocation mainly includes generator reactive support cost 
allocation [9 1. 95] and loss compensation allocation [94. 95. 96. 97. 98]. The main ob­
jective of the research in this area is to help to develop appropriate pricing schemes to 
compensate for the parties that provide these services. 
When compared with research on transmission services cost allocation, there are 
fewer papers being published about assessing impact on system security brought by bi­
lateral transactions in a deregulated environment. Cheng, et al. developed a probabilis­
tic approach to analyze the security of multiple simultaneous transactions in references 
[99. 100]. A transaction matrix wcis used to model the bilateral contracts. .\Ionte Carlo 
methods were used to emulate the market activities. The resulting generation patterns 
were evaluated by load flow studies to a.ssess security. 
5.2.2 Probabilistic Load Flow 
.Many studies have been done to develop a probabilistic load flow [101] - [114], The 
first paper dealing with probabilistic load flow was published in 1974 by Borkowska [105], 
in which it is assumed that branch flow are a linear combination of net nodal flows, and 
that power balance is a function of the sum of power inputs and outputs only. DC power 
flow and convolution techniques of random variables were employed to calculation the 
probabilistic power flow. Further development of the probabilistic power flow included 
FFT based discrete convolution method to facilitate convolution calculation [103]: a 
multilinearisation technique to linearize the power system at several points instead of 
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one [)oi[it to overcoiiie the iionliiioarity of [jouor [low equations [101]: a niethocl to 
calc ulate probabilistic load flow when dependences between loads are considered [108]: 
and an application of the least square method with the number of unknown variables 
greater than the number of equations in probabilistic power flow calculation [109]. 
I)o[)azo. et. al. introduced another method [iOGj. commonly referred to as the .AEP 
' ap[)roach. The linearized power flow equations are treated as a measurement ecpiation 
with th(> uncertainty aspects modeled as additive noise with zero variance and some 
covariaiice matrix. The estimation task is carried out using a weighted least squares 
minimization objective. The solution is obtained using iterative techniques to solve 
the resulting optimality conditions. Further development of the stochastic power flow 
included a method to represent non-Gaussian probability distributions by the method 
of Gaussian sum approximations [110]. and an optimal stochastic load flow model [ill]-
5.3 System Composite Risk Assessment 
If there is only one transaction in the system, then the risk of the transaction brought 
to the system can be easily determined by comparing the system risk change with and 
without this transaction. In this section, we will show how to conduct risk based system 
security assessment for thermal overload and bus voltage out-of-limit using a probabilis­
tic load flow and component risk functions [-5]. 
5.3.1 Probabilistic Load Flow 
In this study, we use a simplified .\EP approach [101, 45]. The approach is based on 
following assumptions: 
• all bus loads, branch flows, and bus voltage magnitudes are normally distributed. 
' A E P  i s  I lie acronym of the company in which this work was done - American Electric Power. 
• a liricarizccl model of the system can be used around the expected value of the bus 
load. 
The above assumptions have been shown to be reasonably accurate [101]. and they 
result in great simplification of the computational procedure [106]. 
Let 
• : be the vector of real part of bus loads 
• Q[^ : be the vector of imaginary part of bus loads 
• Cpp : be the covariance matrix of bus loads between active power 
C p p =  E [ ( P [ ^ -  P l H P L -  P L ^ ]  
• Cq,, : be the covariance matrix of bus loads between reactive power 
C'„ = E[{QL — Ql){QL — QL)^] 
• Cpq : be the covariance matri.x of bus loads between active and reactive power 
C,,= E[(P^- PL)iQL-QLf] 
• CpQ : be the covariance matri.x of bus loads 
C'pQ = 
c  c  
^  p p  p? 
C  pq C  qq 
• r : be a vector of line flow 
• I' : be a vector of bus voltage magnitudes. 
•  T  =  be the vector of line loading at the operating point (assuming the system load 
to be ec|ual to the e.xpected value). 
• V' = be the vector of bus voltage loads at the operating point (a.ssuming the system 
load to be equal to the e.xpected value). 
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•  A T  =  T  - r  
•  A i "  =  \  '  -  r  
.  AP/ .  =  PL-PL 
A l)c the .Jacobian niatri.\ for the linearized model 
.4 = 
•<T.. :JT„ 
• < P l  ' I Q L  
2ii. -'Vy 
••Pl -'QL 
erivation of the .Jacobian matrix A for the linearized model is prf^sented in The ci 
the .Appendix. 
The linearized model of line flow and bus voltages versus ijus load is 
A T  ^ P L  
=  A  X  
A V  ^Ql 
( o . l )  
By using linearized model, we obtain 
A T  
AV 
= 0 (5-2) 
Coc 
A T  
A V  
= AC,„A^ ( 0 .3) 
eqs. o.l and 5.3 can be used to describe the probabilistic load flow algorithm used 
in this study [45]: 
•  S i f p  I :  Solve a deterministic load flow assuming loads equal to the expected value 
Pl and Q^. VVe obtain the expected values of line flows. T. and bus voltages. V. 
•  S t e p  2 :  Compute the linearized model of line flow and bus voltages using equation 
5.1. 
9.', 
• Sh p •>: Conipute the covarianco matrix of the line flows and l)iis voltages using 
fx|nation o.-'i. 
5.3.2 Risk Assessment of Thermal Overload and Bus Out-of-limit Secu­
rity 
In this section, component risk fimctions are introduced for risk assessment of system 
thermal overload and bus out-of-limit security. These functions provide the risk to a 
circuit or bus given only the flow or voltage of that circuit or bus. respectively. 
5.3.2.1 Thermal Overload Risk 
Here, the thermal overload risk of transmission line and transformer is assessed. 
Tninsmission line thermal risk 
We have developed a method that combines probability and impact calculation to 
provide the risk of transmission line overload [5. 22]. The risk, which indicates the 
expectation of the cost consequence associated with thermal overload, may be effectively 
used to make decisions regarding the line loading and system operation. .As described 
in [5]. a given flow through a transmission line may result in thermal overload of the 
conductor, and hence, result in related physical damages and even human injuries. The 
cost consequence or the impact of this thermal overload has been presented in detail 
in [22], .Moreover, it has been also discussed that the possible overload depends not 
only on the given line flow, but also on the ambient weather around the transmission 
line. .An expected value of the overload impact using the conductor thermal model and 
the probabilistic description of ambient weather, is calculated as the component level 
overload risk for the given line under the given load flow. This procedure can be repeated 
under various line flows such that a "Risk - Flow" curve is created for a transmission line. 
The component assessment encapsulates the detailed impact calculation and thermal 
model of a transmission line into its final risk-flow curve such that on the s\'stem side. 
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given that one has this curve, one can dotcriniiio the expected monetary loss clue to the 
line loading directly from its line flow. 
riie Risk-[ lo\v curve is created on a line l)y line basis. Each transmission line has 
its own Risk-Flow based on its local weather condition, physical properties, and system 
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Figure 5.1 Risk-Flow Curve for l3SkV' Line 
Transformer thermal risk 
We have developed a method that combines probability and impact to provide the 
risk of transformer line overload [5. 41]. .\s described in [5. 41]. a given flow through 
a transformer may result in elevation of the temperature of winding and insulation, 
and hence, bring about possible loss of life and equipment damage on the transformer. 
The elevation of temperature is dependent on the uncertain ambient weather conditions. 
Thus, an expected monetary cost consequence of transformer overload is calculated as 
the component overload risk by the probabilistic description of ambient weathers. This 
procedure is repeated under various flows such that a Risk-Flow curve is created for a 
! )7  
E 
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Figure 5 .2  Risk-Flow Curve for 230k\' Line 
transformer. Similar to the component cissessment of a transmission line, a transformer s 
Risk-Flow curvc encapsulates the detailed internal thermal model and probabilistic im­
pact calculation such that on the system side, given that one has this curve, one can 
determine the expected monetary loss due to the line loading directly from its line flow. 
The Risk-Flow curve is created for each transformer based on its local weather con­
dition. physical properties, and system conditions. Figure 5.3 shows an e.xample of such 
a curvc developed in [5]. 
When developing Risk-Flow curves, one need account for the im{)acl of cascading. 
One possible way is assuming a relatively very high cost for cost component cascade in 
Table 2.1 if there is a cascading effect. This is a rough approach. It could be refined 
by including a Risk-Flow curve that accounts for the impact on the circuit only and 
another that accounts for the cascading. The latter one should then be dependent on 
system conditions. More detailed discussion about cascading effect could be found in 
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Figure 5.3 Risk-Flow Curve for 400MV'.-V Transformer 
Thermal limit risk in probabilistic load flow 
In the above component level risk calculation for transmission line and transformer, 
the branch flows are given deterministically. In the probabilistic load flow, as we assume 
that the load is uncertain, the branch flow is also uncertain. If we define the component 
risk for a given flow on branch i (line or transformer) as Risk{Si ) .  the system risk for 
branch /. RiskTi{Si ) .  is given as the expectation of the component risk over the uncertain 
flows on branch i. i.e., 
/ •CO 
RiskTiiS ' i )  = J Pr{ S i )  Risk{ S i )dSi (o.4) 
where 
•  S \  is the load flow on branch i  
•  P r { S , )  is the probability distribution of load flow on branch i  
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5.3.2.2 Bus Voltage Out-of-limit Risk 
Krul users of electricity may be interrupted unrler out-of-limit voltage [-5. 24]. Differ­
ent load classes have different distributions of voltage tolerance and interruption cost. 
I'nder a given l)us voltage, an expected monetary impact on customers due to service 
iiit<Truption is calculated as the component voltage risk at a bus based on its aggre­
gated probabilistic description of load interruption voltages for the load mix at the bus. 
This procedure is repeated under various bus voltages such that a Risk-Voltage curve 
is provided for a load bus. This component level Risk-Voltage curve for a bus encapsu­
lates the detailed evaluation of e.xpected impact and load mi.x into its final Risk-Voltage 
curve such that on the system side, given that one has this curve, one can determine the 
expected monetary loss due to bus voltage out-of-limit directly from its bus voltage. 
The Risk-Voltage curve is created for each bus in a transmission network according 
to its local load mix. Figures 5.4 and 5.5 show e.xamples of such curve for a l3SkV bus 
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Figure 5.4 Risk-Voltage Curve for 138kV Bus 
1 • I • T 
I ,/ 
100 
200 1 1 I 1 . y • 1 — , , 1 1 




















0 1 1 I l i f t  
0 50 100 150 200 2S0 300 350 400 450 
Voltage (kV) 
Figure o.o Risk-Voltage Curve for 230k\' Bus 
Similar to thermal risk, in the probabilistic load flow, the voltage is also uncertain. 
If we define the component risk for a given voltage as Rish{\'j). the bus voltage risk 
Ri.->k\'j{\j) in a probabilistic load flow is 
R l s h V j ( V j )  = J P r { \ j ) R i s k { \ j ) c I V j  (5.5) 
where 
• \ ' j  is the voltage on bus j  
•  P r { \ ' j )  is the probability distribution of voltage on bus j  
To account for the effect of OLTC (on-load-tap-changer) on the load, when develop­
ing the Risk-Voltage curve, one needs to identify the upper side bus voltage when the 
transformer load tap hits its limit and how the lower side bus voltage changes after the 
load tap hits its limit, or alternatively, one can develop tlie Risk-Voltage curve based on 
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iflatioiisliip hotweeii lower side voltage and load first, and then transform the curve to 
the upper side voltage by taking into account the OLTC effect. 
5.3.3 Considering Credible Contingencies 
W e assume that the credible contingency set for overload and voltage problem is 
identified a priori. This set consists of a list of component outages to be considered in 
tfie anaKsis. By using component risk functions, we can easily incorporate the risk of 
credible contingencies into the component risk functions by modifying the eqs. oA and 
5.5 as follows: 
• h represents the state of the system. A* = 1 is the base case, and k > 1 means 
{k — I)'' ' post-contingency configuration 
• .V — I is the number of credible contingencies 
•  P r ( h )  is the probability of the system in f c ^ ' ^  state in the ne.xt hour. 
5.3.4 System Composite Risk 




s y s t e m  
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5.4 Risk Assessment for Multiple Simultaneous Transactions 
5.4.1 Transaction Order 
Duo to liigli nonlinearity of load flow and component risk functions, the risk allocation 
results are order-dependent. To he fair to each transaction, we cannot ari)itrarily a.ssunie 
an order for risk evaluation. In some power markets, each short-term transaction is 
given a time stamp based on the submitting time. These time stamps therefore are 
used to determine the curtailment order in case of transmission congestion [115. 116]. 
It is possii)le that the same order determined by the time stamps could be used for 
risk allocation calculation. Vet this is not a universal rule accepted by all the e.xisting 
markets. Thus, in the rest of this study, a more general situation, under which we 
are unable to distinguish transactions" relative order based on their time stamps, is 
considered. We call these transactions multiple simultaneous transactions. However, 
the methods developed in this study can be easily modified to deal with the known-
order situation. 
5.4.2 Power Flow Based Methods (Ml, M2, M3, M4) 
Power flow ba.sed methods determine the risk allocation quantity by comparing sys­
tem composite risk with and without an individual transaction. In this section, the 
following four power flow based methods are considered: 
• First marginal risk method (Ml) 
The first marginal risk method assumes that each transaction is the first to be 
added on the system. Thus, the risk allocated to a transaction is the system 
composite risk with the transaction less the system composite risk without the 
transaction. 
l O - i  
• I.ast marginal risk method (M2) 
[ h<' last marginal risk method assumes that each transaction is the last to be added 
on the system. Thus, the risk allocated to a transaction is the system composite 
risk with all the transactions less system composite risk with all the transactions 
cxcept the one under evaluation. 
• Full enumeration method (M3) 
The full enumeration method is assumed to eliminate any discrimination among all 
transactions. .All the possible simulation orders should be considered. Therefore, 
if n transactions are involved, a total of n! ca^es. which cover all the possible 
transaction sequences, is simulated. For example, if n = 3. there are all together 
six possible transaction simulation orders as shown in Table 5.1. Then, the risk 
allocated to transaction k. 's 
1 
ARiskric = —75^ ARiskrhiJ) (5.8) 
nl j=i 
where ARiskrhiJ) represents the incremental risk brought by the addition of trans­
action k in the jth simulation sequence. 
• Reduced enumeration method (M4) 
Table 5.1 Possible Transaction .Simulation Orders for ri = 3 
Simulation Trans. I's Trans. 2"s Trans. 3"s 
Orders .Additional Risk .Additional Risk •Additional Risk 
1 1 -r 2 ^ 3 ARisk-riil) ^RiskT2{'~) ARiskT3{-:i)  
2 1 ^ 3 ^  2  ARisknil) A/?/.SA;7-2(3) ARisknCi) 
3 2 -> 1 ^ 3 ^Riskxi (2) A/?/.SA:7-2( 1) ARIskr^i-^) 
4 2 3 ^ 1 ARiskriCi) A/?/•'> A:7-2( 1) A/?/.SA-t3(2) 
5 3 -> 1 ^ 2 ARisk-ri (2) ARiskT2i-i)  ARisk-fsi  1) 
6 3 2 1 ARiskTii'S) A/?^S^•T2(2) ARisk'xsi  1) 
lO- l  
Altlu>ugli the full cmuneratioii method can provide most comprciiensive risk allo­
cation results, its main disadvantage is that it is too time consuming for a large 
numijer of transactions, since it requires considering all possible transaction se-
([uences, which is »!. In order to overcome this problem, a reduced enumeration 
method is proposed. This approach recpiires two power flow calculations for each 
transaction so that the "first marginal component" and the "last marginal com­
ponent" are obtained. The "first marginal component" identifies the risk as if the 
transaction were the first one added to the system. The "last marginal component" 
identified the risk as if the transaction were the last one added to the system. The 
average of the two is identified a^ the transaction's true contribution. So if there 
are n transactions, the total number of risk based power flow required is 2n -1-2 at 
most. 
5.4.3 Sensitivity Based Methods (M5, M6) 
Compared with power flow based methods, sensitivity based methods can provide 
faster answers to the risk allocation problem. This method rests on an assumption 
that risk varies linearly with bus power injection. It provides a quick calculation of 
the incremental risk by means of the risk sensitivity factor. The risk sensitivity factor 
appro.vimates the change in system risk associated with a change in load or generation 
output. The risk sensitivity factor with respect to generator bus i is 
where RSF, is the risk sensitivity factor on bus i .  Rish is either the system total risk 
or a component risk, and Pi is the injection power on bus i. which can either be load or 
generation. 
By using the bus risk sensitivit\' factors, the change in system risk can be determined 
l O o  
using the following cciuation (Mo) 
= Risk'^''^ + ^  RSF. X A P. (5.10) 
t  
wiu^rc Risk""^' is the system risk with the transaction, and Ri.'<k'^''^ is the system risk 
without the transaction. 
.\ow. the problem is how to compute the risk sensitivity factors. It seems that the 
most straightforward way to calculate bus sensitivity factors is by inverting load flow 
Jacobian matri.x as shown in .Appendi.x D. But the sensitivity factors obtained in this 
way are only related to generation, not to load. If there e.xist load and generation at 
the same bus. then increasing load or decreasing generation at that bus will cause no 
difference in load flow results. But they will bring different risk to the system in our risk 
calculation since the results of probabilistic load flow and impact of load interruption will 
change as the load size and its uncertainty change. .\Iso. due to the high nonlinearity 
of risk functions, these factors are only useful in a very small range and can not give a 
reasonable accuracy risk allocation for each transaction. 
In this study, a simulation-based risk sensitivity factor calculation procedure is devel­
oped. The first step in this procedure is developing a base Ccise. in which the total load 
is modeled as the sum of all the transactions which are already in place. .After the base 
case is created, the s\stem composite risk can be computed. Each generator or load bus 
can be associated at most with four sets of sensitivity factors: the generation sale risk 
sensitivity factors (RSFGS). the generation purchase risk sensitivity factors (RSFGP). 
the load sale risk sensitivity factors (RSFLS). and the load purchase risk sensitivity fac­
tors (RSFLP). The generation sale risk sensitivity relates to the change in system risk 
to a predefined transfer block size increa.se of generation at this bus. The generation 
purchase risk sensitivity reflects the change in system risk to a predefined transfer block 
size decrease of generation at this bus. The load sale risk sensitivity relates to the change 
in system risk to a predefined transfer block size decrease of load at this bus. The load 
l O G  
purchase risk sensitivity reflects the change in system risk to a precl<>fiiied transfer i)lock 
size increase of load at this bus. 
Due to the high nonlinearity of risk functions, the transfer block size used for the 
sale and purchase simulation will greatly affect the accuracy of the results. The closer 
this block size is to the actual transaction amoiuit. the more accurate are the results. In 
order to improve accuracy, a risk sensitivity factor database is created offline, in which a 
series of risk sensitivity factors are computed according to different transfer block sizes in 
simulation. When evaluating the actual transactions online, the risk sensitivity factors 
with the closest transfer block size are used. Figure -5.6 shows the procedure used in the 
study to calculate block size based risk sensitivity factors. 
Furthermore, since the sum of the allocated risk using this method usually does not 
ecpial to the increased s\stem total risk with all the transactions, a modified method 
(.\I6) is also proposed as eq. o.ll. in which the risk sensitivity factors are only used as 
weighting coefficients to allocate the increased system total risk (among the 
transactions (/?/.sA:,). The advantage of this modified method is that not only does it 
reflect an appropriate risk allocation but also it guarantees that the total system risk 
equals the sum of the allocated risk. 
Risk,  = ARisk'^"' '  X (5-11) 
5.5 Numerical Examples 
In this section, test case results are presented and analyzed with different risk allo­
cation methods discussed in the previous section. The IEEE RTS'96 system [oS] is used. 
It is assumed that in the base case the e.xpected system load is IS19 .\IW and total 
generation capacity is 2305 MVV. .Also, we made the following statistical assumptions 
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[117]: the staiKlarcI deviation for the load on the same bus is 19? of its mean value, the 
forrelatiori coefficient between active power and reactive power of the load on the same 
bus is 0.5. the correlation coefficient among active power of the load on different bus 
but same voltage level is 0.1. the correlation coefficient between active power and reac­
tive power of the load on the different bus but same voltage level is 0.2. the correlation 
coefficient among active power and reactive power of the load on the different bus and 
different voltage level is 0. Table -5.2 shows the assumed credible contingency set in the 
example. This contingency set is determined by choosing the five contingencies with the 
highest outage probability, whose outage rate is higher than 0.45 outages/year, as given 
in [58]. This contingency set is chosen only for illustration purposes. In reality, it might 
be e.xpanded and should be identified by some security assessment procedures [118]. 
.Assume that three transactions are submitted to the system operator and are going 
to be in effect simultaneously during the ne.xt hour. Their locations and amount are 
listed in Table 5.3. 
Table 5.2 .Assumed Credible Contingency Set 
Outage From Bus To Bus Probability 
line A'2 I 3 5.S2e-05 
line .A5 2 6 5.4Se-05 
line .A21 12 23 5.94e-05 
line .A22 13 23 5.59e-0o 
line .A30 17 22 6.16e-05 
Table 5.3 Three Transactions 
Seller Buyer MVV amount 
Trans 1 Bus 15 Bus 1 40 
Trans2 Bus 16 Bus 6 20 
Trans3 Bus 23 Bus 2 30 
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5.5.1 Power Flow Based Methods 
lable o.-l shows the risk allocation results by the four power flow based methods. It 
coiifinns that different power flow simulation sequences lead to different risk allocation 
results. The full eruimeration method (M3) provides the least discriminatory results 
among transactions. L nfortunately. it is too time-consuming iiecauseof the large number 
of simulations (/?!) needed. The reduced enumeration method (.M-1) provides a very good 
appro.ximation to the results of the full enumeration method and greatly reduces the 
simulation time (< 2n + 2) when the number of transactions is large. 
The total increased risk due to these three transactions is S25.7o. Table .0.4 shows 
that only the full enumeration can recover system increased total risk while reduced 
enumeration can give very close results. The first marginal risk method (.Ml) under­
estimates the risk contribution of each transaction, while the last marginal risk method 
(.M2) over-estimates the true risk contribution of each transaction. This is mainly due 
to the high steepness of the component risk functions. .Among all these four methods, 
the reduced enumeration method can give reasonable accuracy with faster speed as 
compared to the full enumeration method. 
5.5.2 Sensitivity Based Methods 
Figure o.T shows the risk sensitivity factors on buses I. 2. 6. lo. 16, 23 which are 
related to the three transactions in the sample system. The sensitivity factors for Buses 1. 
Table 5.4 Risk .•\llocation Results by PF 
Based Methods 
Trans1($) Trans2 ($) Trans3 (S) Total(S) 
Ml 0.14 1S.6S 1.07 19.S9 
M2 4.S1 21.48 5.71 32.00 
M3 2.41 20.02 3.33 25.76 
M4 2.47 20.0S 3.-39 25.94 
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"J. f) are re[>r('s(Mitecl load sale and pinchase risk sensitivity factors ({{SI'CIS and RSFCIP). 
while the sensitivity factors for buses lo. 16. "23 are related to generation sale and 
[>urrliase risk sensitivity factors (R.SFLS and RSFLP). .As expected, these sensitivity 
factors e.xhibit their highly nonlinear properties. 
Table 5.5 shows the risk allocation results for each transaction using the risk sensi­
tivity factors ol)lained from the closest block size. It can be seen that compared with 
power flow based methods, sensitivity provides less accurate allocation results. Table 
5.5 also gives the risk allocation results by the modified sensitivity method. 
Table 5.5 Risk .-Vllocation Results by Sensi-
tivitx' Based .Methods 
Trans1(S) Trans2 (S) Trans3 (S) Total(S) 
.\I5 0.74 22.22 1..32 24.28 
.\I6 0.79 23.57 1.10 25.76 
5.5.3 Discussions 
Power flow based methods generally provide more accurate result.s than sensitivity 
based methods, but they are usually more time-consuming. The time requirement for all 
power flow based approaches are, at least, proportional to the number of transactions. 
•Sensitivity ba.sed methods are relatively faster in providing risk allocation results. But 
accuracy is sacrificed due to the high nonlinearity of component risk functions. Further­
more. since an off-line simulation method is used to obtain the risk sensitivity factors, 
the ability to give an accurate base case forecast is essential. 
5.6 Summary 
In this chapter, a risk based security asse.ssment approach for bilateral power trans­
action security analysis is presented. The approach takes advantage of risk based se­
curity assessment by considering the uncertainties in the real power system operating 
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Figure 5.7 Risk Sensitivity on Buses 1.2,6,15.16.23 
112 
coiulitioii. Several risk allocation nietliods for sirmdtaneous bilateral transactions are 
discussed. We Ijelieve the risk index associated with each transaction could be use(l 
for many i)ur[)oscs. especially for transmission {)ricing and congestion management in a 
deregulated environment. 
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CHAPTER 6 RISK BASED OPTIMAL POWER FLOW 
6.1 Introduction 
The purpose of an OPF is to schedule power system controls to optimize an objective 
function while satisfying a set of nonlinear equality/ and inequality constraints. Examples 
of these equality and inequality constraints include generation/load balance, bus voltage 
limits, power flow equations, branch flow limits (including both transmission line and 
transformer), active/reactive reserve limits, and limits on all control variables [llS. 119]. 




Pi — ^ ViV'jVijCosiOij + Sj - 5i) = 0 
Q, + ^  V,VjYijsin{0,j  + Sj -  ^ ,) = 0 
5,,I < 
'J I — ^  I J  
P < P < P * gt ,mtn ^  '  m — '  51,max 
Qyi,Tnin ^  Qgi — Qgi^maj: 
We will refer to the above problem as problem 0. The objective function is the total cost 
of real generation. The first two constraints are power flow constraints. The next is the 
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l)raiKli power flow limits constraints. The fourth is the bus volt age const raints. And the 
last two arc activc and rcactive power generation constraints. The traditional security 
constrained OPF-^ (SC'OPF) need include constraints that represent operation of the sys­
tem after .\-l contingency outages. The system will be operated so that if a contingency 
happened, the resulting branch flow and bus voltages would still be within the emer­
gency voltage and emergency thermal limits prior to system readjustment [I IS. 121]. In 
order to include these constraints and avoid heavy computation, usually a set of credi­
ble contingencies, which is usually selected by a security assessment procedure [US], is 
formed and the constraints corresponding post-outages after these credible contingencies 
are added to the OPF constraints. 
Problem 0 uses deterministic constraints. The deterministic method provides a very 
simi:)le way in making this decision: optimize economy within hard constraints of the 
secure operational region. It is this simplicity that has made the deterministic method 
so useful in the past. Today, however, with the industry's emphasis on economic com­
petition. and with the associated increased network vulnerability, there is a growing 
recognition that this simplicity also carries with it significant subjectivity, and this can 
result in constraints that are not uniform with respect to the security level. This suggests 
that the ultimate decisions that are made may not be the "best" ones [IS]. 
It is well known that probabilistic methods constitute powerful tools for use in many 
kinds of decision-making problems. Therefore, today there is a great deal of interest in 
using them to enhance the security-economy decision making problem. The US West­
ern Systems Coordinating Council (VV'SCC) is developing probabilistic based reliability 
criteria [122]. .A recent CIGRE report [123] recommended further study of probabilistic 
security assessment methods, and an ongoing CIGRE task force. 3S.02.21. is implement­
ing this recommendation. .An IEEE PES tcisk force is studying probabilistic aspects of 
reliability criteria, and there was a panel session dedicated to this subject at the 1999 
PES Summer .Meeting [122, 124]. .Another panel session at this same meeting focused 
on risk-basorl clyiianiir security asscssniorit [G. 59. 60. 12o. 126. 127. 12S. 129]. I he 
t liemc of most of this work is that security level can be cjuantitatively a.ssessecl using 
a probabilistic metric. .-Mthough the industry has not reached a conclusion regarding 
which probabilistic metrics are best, there is consensus that using them has potential to 
improve analysis and decision-making [IS]. 
In this chapter, a risk based Optimal Power Flow (OPF) is developed. The method 
assumes that power demand in each bus is random and normally distributed associated 
with the forecasted value as its mean and some variance. Credible contingencies are also 
taken into account by incorporating into the component risk functions. The component 
risk functions are then used to replace the traditional deterministic constraints. There 
arc three ways to form the risk based OPF: set individual risk limit on each component, 
set an overall system risk limit, and treat the system risk as a part of objective. We 
believe that risk based OPF is a useful decision-niaking tool to help the system operator 
to balance the risk and cost in today's competitive market. 
6.2 Literature Review 
The OPF problem has been discussed since its introduction by Carpentier in 1962 
[lis]. Economic dispatch is its simplest form. It has been evolved to represent any 
procedure that is meant to minimize or ma.ximize a certain objective function while 
satisfying the power system constraints. Because OPF is a very large, non-linear math­
ematical programming problem, it has taken decades to develop efficient algorithms for 
its solution. 
The objective function of optimization can be 1) minimum fuel costs. 2) minimum 
loss. 3) minimum possible adjustments 4) minimum load shedding, o) maximum loadabil-
ity. and 6) rna.ximum market surplus [119. I.JO. 131. 132. 133. 134]. .\lgorithms used to 
solve the OPF include augmented lagrangian methods [US], generalized reduced gradi-
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cut [IIS. I 19], |)rojocted augincntcdiagrangiaii [I3-"). Kif)]. siicrossivc linear progratnriiing 
[i:{I]. soc|iieiitial ciuadratic programming [120. 1;{7] and using interior point algorithm 
[117. 138. 139]. hi what follows, a brief review of latter three is provided. 
• Successive Linear Programming [120. 131] 
The Successive Linear Progranmiing (SLP) is perhaps the most well-established 
methods for OPFs. In this method, both the objective and the constraints are 
linearized around a given point (typically, the solution from the previous iteration) 
and an LP is solved. SLP is chosen to solve the risk based OPF in this study and 
will be discussed in detail in the ne.xt section. 
• Sequential Quadratic Programming [136. 137] 
The Sequential Quadratic Programming (SQP) can be regarded as an e.Ktension 
of the quasi-Newton methods to constrained optimization. .-Vs the name suggests, 
the methods solves the original problem by repetitively solving a quadratic pro­
gramming appro.ximation. Both the quadratic appro.ximation of the objective and 
the linear appro.ximation of the constrained are based on Taylor's series e.xpansion 
of the nonlinear functions around the current iteration points. 
• Interior Point Methods [117. 139] 
The interior point method does not solve for the optimal solution by following 
the points on the constraint boundary, but rather it follows a path through the 
interior of the constraints directly toward the optimal solution on the constraint 
boundary. In this approach, no distinction is made between the state variables and 
control variables. Slack variables are added which convert functional inequalities to 
equalities. Bounded constraints are replaced by adding them as additional terms in 
the objective function using logarithmic barrier functions. Then. Newton's method 
or linear programming is used to solve the resultant optimization problem which 
has only equality constraints. 
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Among tlu's*' al)ove three algorithms. .SQP is better able to handle nonlinear objectives 
and constraints present in the OPF. However, the SQP is currently not com[)etitive for 
large scale systems because of large dimension of approximating quadratic programming 
I)roI)lem and the complexity and reliability of quadratic programming algorithms [US. 
1;}7]. The SLP is presently the most favored methods for OPFs. because of the robustness 
of the underlying linear programming. Interior point methods are still largely in the 
research/trial phase, but have the potential of exceeding SLP methods for large scale 
6.3 Formulating Risk Based Optimal Power Flow Problem 
In Section 5.3. the approaches for assessing thermal overload risk and bus out-of-
limit risk, using a probabilistic load flow and component risk functions, are presented. 
These component risk functions include following uncertainties: the weather, load, and 
contingency (see Section 5.3.2). Based on these functions, the risk based optimal power 
flow can be formulated into three different ways as shown in the following sub-sections. 
6.3.1 Problem 1: Set Individual Risk Limit On Each Component 
Here, we set a risk limit on each component in the system. Thus, the objective of the 
OPF is minimizing the total generation cost while keeping the risk of each component 
below a predefined limit, as shown in ecj. 6.2. 
OPFs. 
(6.2)  
l i s  
sul)j('Ct to 
P, -  ^  \ \\'jY,jCos{0,j + 5j - ) = 0 
Q, + ^  ^ ^ i j^in(Otj  + Sj — S,)  = 0 
Ris T,  (S\)  < Rink To 
Risk I j  (Vj)  < Risk I q 
where RiskT , { S i )  is the transmission line and transformer thermal risk computed by 
cq.  5.6.  Risk\  ]{\  ' i )  is  the bus voltage out-of-l imit  r isk computed by eq.  -5.7.  and RiskTo 
and RiskV'o are assumed the ma.ximum risk values tolerated by the system operator. It 
should be noted that all the variables in objective functions and constraints are expected 
values. The advantage of this formulation that the system operator can control risk level 
of each component. While the disadvantage is that he cannot control the system total 
risk directly. 
6.3.2 Problem 2; Set An Overall System Risk Limit 
Since thermal risk and voltage out-of-limit risk both have units of dollars, we can 
replace these limits by using one single system overall limit. Thus, as shown in eq. 6.3. 
the objective of OPF is minimizing the total generation cost while keeping the system 
total risk below a predefined limit. 
(6.3) 
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su l ) j ( ' < " t  t o  
P, — ^ ViVj\\ jCos{0,j  + 8j — S,)  = 0 
Q t  +  ^  ^  A  i j C o s { d -  - r  S j  —  S , )  =  0  
^ < Ri. '^krVo 
p  < p < p  
'  ' j i .mtn _ '  ji  _  * gt ,niaT 
Q^t.Tnin ^ Q31 ^ 'jt,maT 
Here. Ri^kTVo is assumed the system risk limit tolerated by the system operator. The 
advantage of this formulation is that the system operator can directly control the system 
total risk. While the disadvantage is the risk might be distributed so disproportionately 
that a very small number of components take the most part of the system total risk. 
6.3.3 Problem 3: Treat The System Risk As A Part of Objective 
Since the generation cost and system risk both have units of dollars, they can be put 
into the objective function together as follows. 
niin '^i(^ ^ f{PJ,)) +u,'2(^^ Ri^kT,(Si)  +  ^  ^ RiskVj(\ j))  (6.4) 
subject to 
Pi - ^  \ ] V j Y i j C o s { d i j  + S j  - S i )  =0 
Qi + ^ " \'i\ j\ijcos{0ij + SJ — Si) = 0 
P  < P < P  '  gt,Tni7i _  '  J* _  '  gt^maj: 
Qgi.min ^  Qgi — Qgi.rnaar 
0 < < I 
0 < ^ ' 2 < 1 
-|" iiJ2 ~  ^
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wIktc aiifl are weighting coefficients. The atlvantage of this foriiiulatioii is that 
the system operator can choose weighting coelficieiits leased on his attitnrle towards 
generation cost and risk, or reflecting the uncertainty of generation cost and risk. While 
the flisadvantage is tliat he cannot directly control the system total risk or the risk on 
each component. 
6.4 Algorithm to Solve The Risk Based Optimal Power Flow 
In this section, the algorithm to solve the above OPF problems using successive linear 
programming technique is presented. 
The OPF problem 1-3 can be rewritten in the following compact form. 
The algorithm we used in this study proceeds as follows [120]. 
•  S'/e/j  I:  Set iteration counter A: <— 0 and choose appropriate initial values. 
•  Step 2: Solve the equality constraint (using probabilistic load flow) equations. 
i n  i  n  / ( X ) )  (6.5) 
subject to 
gilxi .xo) = 0 {equalitycon. '^traints)  
^•2(xi.x2) <0 {inequalil i jconslrainls)  
•  Step 3: Linearize the problem around solve the resulting LP for A.z-
(6 .6)  
-A < Ax < A 
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•  Sir[> /; S<'t A- f- A: + 1. update current solution ' + A.r. 
• .V/r/; o: Check whether 
-— = — h A —— < totcrancc I 
Ox ax ax 
g { x )  <  t o l t r a n c e >  
Ax < tolerance:} 
if yes. slop: if not. continue. 
•  Step ():  .\djust step size limit A based on the trust region algorithm [140]. go to 
Step 2. 
For the termination criteria given in Step 5. A is the vector of Lagrange mvdtipliers of 
the LP problem. The first condition pertains to the size of the gradient, the second to 
the violation of the constraints, and the third to the step size. 
Quite frequently, the value of x' '  given by Step 1 results in an infeasible LP problem. 
In such cases, a slack variable is added for each violated constraint. These slack variables 
nuist be zero at the optimal solution [120]. 
The procedure described above is basically a standard procedure for traditional OPF 
problem (problem 0) using linear programming except for Step 2. in which a probabilistic 
load flow (see Section 5.3.1) is used to compute eqs. 5.6 and 5.7 for the system risk. It 
should be noted that ecjs. 5.6 and 5.7 also include the risk of credible contingencies. 
6.5 Numerical Illustration 
The risk ijased optimal power flow algorithm was applied to the modified IEEE 
RTS 96 system (see .-Xppendix B). The expected load is 1909MVV. and total generation 
capacity is 2305MV\'. Other data regarding some statistical and contingency assumptions 
are the same as what is given in in Section 5.5. 
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Table 6.1 Deterniiiiistic Liniils 
Item Lower limit Upper limit 
i;}8k\' line - 17.5-\IV.\ 
2:J0k\' line - 500.\I\'.\ 
400.\[\ A .Xfmr - too.\iv.\ 
138k\' bus r24.20K\' 15l.80K\' 
230k\' bus 207.00KV 253.00K\^ 
6.5.1 Problem 0: Using Deterministic Limits 
In this case, we still set deterministic OPP" formulation. The deterministic limits for 
lines, transformers, and bus voltages are given in the Table 6.1. 
The limits for the line and transformer are given in [58] as the values of short-time 
emergency ratings (STE) of the equipment. The criterion for the bus voltage limits is 
that there should be no expected load interruption under that voltage. So from Figures 
5.1 and 5.5. we obtain the limits shown in Table 6.1. 
The optimal e.xpected generation cost is S30967.43/hr. The risk calculation results 
are given in Table 6.2 and Table 6.3. They show that the system risk is dominated 
by the bus voltage-out-of-limit risk which is •S'3975.49/hr. while the total thermal risk 
is only bl.l6/hr. The high bus voltage out-of-limit risk in the case is caused by the 
assumption that all the loads are commercial loads which are assumed to be sensitive to 
bus voltage change and have very high load interruption costs [24]. The highest voltage 
risk is from bus 13 which is Sl729.37/hr. Calculation shows that its base case e.xpected 
bus voltage is 249.09I\V with its variance 2.92. .Although its e.xpected value does not 
exceed its limit (253.00KV). the bus still suffers a very high risk because of the tail of 
bus voltage distribution which is outside the limit. 
The differences among the voltage out-of-limit risks for different bus are very large in 
Table 6.3. This is mainly because of steep shape of Risk-Voltage curves shown in Figure 
5.4 and 5.5. 
I'aljle 6.2 Tlioniial Risk for Deterininislic 
Constrained Case 
Line or .\fmr Risk(§) Line or Xfmr Risk(§) 
1-2 0.00 12-13 0.00 
1-3 0.00 12-23 0.00 
1-0 0.00 13-23 0.00 
2-} 0.00 14-16 0.08 
2-6 0.00 1.5-16 0.00 
;}-9 0.00 15-21 0.00 
3-24 0.23 1-5-21 0.00 
4-9 0.00 1-5-24 0.00 
5-10 0.00 16-17 0.00 
6-10 0.00 16-19 0.00 
7-S 0.00 17-18 0.00 
S-9 0.00 17-22 0.00 
S-10 0.00 18-21 0.00 
9-11 0.09 18-21 0.00 
9-12 0.23 19-20 0.00 
10-11 0.20 19-20 0.00 
10-12 0.40 20-23 0.00 
11-13 0.00 20-23 0.00 
11-14 0.00 21-22 0.00 
Table 6.3 \''oltage-out-of-limit Risk for De­
terministic Constrained Case 
Bus No. Risk(S) Bus Xo. Risk(§) 
1 1-5-5.84 13 1729.37 
2 208.33 14 1284.86 
3 0.00 15 73.32 
4 0.00 16 43.62 
5 0.00 17 0.00 
6 0.00 18 212.78 
/ 0.00 19 117.80 
8 0.00 20 14 9.-55 
9 0.00 21 0.00 
10 0.00 22 0.00 
11 0.00 23 0.00 
12 0.00 24 0.00 
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6.5.2 Problem 1: Set Individual Risk Limit On Each Component 
In this ease, we assume that the maximum component risk accepted by the utilities 
is S.JOO.OO/hr and set it as the limit for both branch bus voltage. The optimal expected 
gcMieration cost is S309S4.94. The total thermal risk for transmission line and transformer 
is si.20/hr and the total risk for voltage out of limit is SiSr2.;}5/hr. Table 6.4 and 6.0 
show the distribution of these risks on each component. Comparing with case 1. It is 
found that although the generation cost increase about Sl7.ol/hr. the total system risk 
is reduced about S216."i. 10/hr. This is mainly because the voltage-out-of-limit risks of 
some high risk bus such as bus I."3 and 14 are greatly reduced. This example shows how 
effectively the system operator can reduce system risk by trading off between risk and 
cost. 
In this case, there are no bounded branch thermal limits. The Lagrange multipliers 
related to bounded voltage limits are shown in Table 6.6. Since the units of the objective 
function and limits are the same, these multipliers give us a direct feeling about how 
effective they are if we relax these limits. They are also useful in identifying the most 
effective means of improving the objective. 
Figure 6.1 gives the relationship between the total generation cost and component 
limit. It shows that rela.xing component risk will reduce the generation cost. But it 
becomes more and more ineffective to do so. 
6.5.3 Problem 2: Set An Overall System Risk Limit 
In this case, we combine the system thermal risk and voltage out-of-limit risk into one 
single overall system risk. Figure 6.2 shows the relation between the generation cost and 
system risk limit. This figure can help the system operator to determine a reasonable 
system risk limit to balance the cost and benefit. Figure 6.3 shows the relationship 
between Lagrange multiplier A with system risk limit. It shows that how effective it is 
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Faljit' G.4 Distril>ulion of Thennal Risk for 
Risk Constrained Case 
Line or Xfmr Risk(§) Line or Xfmr Risk(§) 
1-2 0.00 12-13 0.01 
1-3 0.00 12-23 0.01 
1-5 0.00 13-23 0.00 
2-4 0.00 14-16 0.00 
2-6 0.00 15-16 0.00 
3-9 0.00 15-21 0.00 
3-24 0.24 15-21 0.00 
4-9 0.00 15-24 0.00 
5-10 0.00 16-17 0.00 
6-10 0.00 16-19 0.00 
7-S 0.00 17-lS 0.00 
S-9 0.00 17-22 0.00 
S-10 0.00 18-21 0.00 
9-li o.os 18-21 0.00 
9-12 0.23 19-20 0.00 
10-11 0.19 19-20 0.00 
10-12 0.42 20-23 0.00 
11-13 0.00 20-23 0.00 
11-14 0.00 21-22 0.00 
Table 6.5 Distribution of \'olt-
age-out-of-limit Risk for Risk 
Constrained Case 
Bus No. Risk(S) Bus No. Risk(§) 
1 116.83 13 300.00 
2 111.01 14 300.00 
3 0 15 128.59 
4 0 16 49.72 
5 0 17 0.00 
6 0 18 300.00 
7 0 19 206.19 
8 0 20 300.00 
9 0 21 0 
10 0 22 0 
11 0 23 0 
12 0 24 0 
faille 6.6 Lagrange Multipliers for 
Bounclecl Constraints 
Item Risk(s) \ alue Multiplier 
BTS 13 300.00 251.62 K\' 0.020 
Bl'S 11 300.00 251.62 K\ 0.007 
Bl'S IS 300.00 253.23 KV 0-006 
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Figure 6.1 Generation Cost vs. Component Risk Limit 
to reduce the generation cost by increasing overall system risk limit. 
6.5.4 Problem 3: Treat The System Risk As A Part of Objective 
In this case, we minimize system risk and total generation cost simultaneously. Table 
6.7 shows the relationship between generation cost and system total risk with different 
weighting coefficients and 0:2- As we stated before, the choice of u-'i and ujy will reflect 
the system operator s attitude tow^ards generation cost and risk. It shows that, for a 
risk-neutral person who treats risk and generation cost as the same, the best solution 
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Figure 6.-} Lagrange Multiplier vs. System Risk Limit 
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Table (J . I  Solution to Problem 3 
Xo. w'-J Cost (!T!/lir) Risk (s/hr) Total (§/lir) 
1 0.0 1.0 33121.20 0-59 .33121.79 
2 0.1 0.9 31752.16 0.S5 31753.01 
0.2 o.s 31123.51 1.13 31124.64 
•I  0.3 0.7 31062.90 1.16 31064.06 
•5 0.4 0.6 31015.6.S 1.71 31017.39 
(i 0.5 0.5 31002.07 2.-54 31004.61 
1 0.6 0.4 31000.09 7.65 31007.74 
s 0.7 0.3 3099S.26 S.26 31006..52 
9 o.s 0.2 30994.37 16.74 31011.11 
10 0.9 0.1 30992.43 18.34 31010.77 
11 1.0 0.0 30357.55 624722.87 65-5080.42 
6.6 Summary 
In this chapter, a risk based optimal power flow is developed. The method assumes 
that power demand in each bus is random and normally distributed associated with the 
forecasted value as its mean and some variance. The uncertainties associated with load 
characteristics, weather conditions, and contingencies are incorporated into the compo­
nent risk functions. The traditional inequality deterministic constraints such as branch 
thermal limits and bus voltage limits are replaced by the probabilistic risk functions for 
each transmission line, transformer and bus. A successive linear programming algorithm 
is adopted to solve the risk based OPF problem in this study. Risk based OPF provides 
a useful decision-making tool to help the system operator to balance system risk and 
cost. 
CHAPTER 7 CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR 
FUTURE WORK 
7.1 Conclusions 
The goal of this research is to develop quantitative risk based methodologies for 
system security assessment with the consideration of the probabilistic nature of electric 
hulk system behavior. The work includes developing methods for assessing impact for 
different insecurity, assessing risk associated with high loading on transformers used in 
the bulk transmission systems, assessing risk associated with special protection systems, 
assessing and selecting power system transactions based on risk, defining and solving a 
risk based optimal power flow problem. The following sections present the conclusions 
from this work. 
7.1.1 Impact Assessment for RBSA 
In risk assessment, one must address probabilit\' and impact. In order to quantita­
tively compare different types of security problems or to obtain a composite evaluation 
of security, a unified common measure of severity is necessary. Therefore, a momentary 
measure, which is a function of the traditional performance measures (e.g. line current, 
bus voltage magnitude, transient voltage dip. etc.). is proposed. The template form 
for impact classification provides a direct mean to help estimate momentary costs for 
different security problems 
i ; JO 
7.1.2 Risk Assessment for Transformer Loading 
In today"s competitive electric energy market environment, the incentive to heavily 
load power transformers is being driven by the need to achieve increased profits and 
tlie related reluctance to invest in new facilities. Hence, there is considerable inter­
est in identifying decision-making criteria so that they can be fully, but safely utilized. 
The risk-based method developed in this study assess transformer loading capability, 
taking into accoimt the probabilistic nature of time-varying loads and ambient temper­
ature. Compared with the traditional deterministic methods, this method determines a 
realistic estimate of transformer thermal loading capability by using probabilistic charac­
terization of uncertainty rather than using conservative deterministic values. It provides 
a c[uantitative risk index that can be used to detect high risk situations. It can also 
be used, together with risk calculation for transmission lines overload, voltage collapse, 
voltage out-of-limit. and transient instability to obtain a composite risk as a function of 
operating conditions. W'e believe that this method is helpful in making decisions related 
to trading off risk against the economic benefits that may result from a transformer 
loading level. 
7.1.3 Risk Assessment for Special Protection Systems 
SPS have been proliferating over the past ten years. There is every expectation that 
this trend will continue in the foreseeable future because SPS is perceived to repre­
sent an attractive alternative to expensive transmission reinforcements when security-
constrained transmission capacity needs to be expanded. It is essential to develop a 
security assessment framework for SPS to maintain a reasonable level of that integrity 
in this part of power system infrastructure. In this study, a risk based approach is 
proposed. .A. generic procedure is developed for risk based assessment of SPS. .-V relia­
bility assessment procedure using FME.\ and Markov techniques is also presented. To 
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illustrate the proposed approaches, an example, using a [)ortion of the IEEE reliability 
test system together with an illustration of the CRS logic, is provided to show how to 
calculate CIFi-S reliability and how to iiitegrate the influence of CR.S reliability into the 
risk-based security assessment. 
7.1.4 Risk Assessment for Bilateral Transactions 
Transaction analysis become a more and more important issue with the increas­
ing number of transactions in the current deregulated power system. Compared with 
the research on transmission services cost allocation, there are fewer papers being pub­
lished about assessing impact on system security brought by bilateral transactions in a 
deregulated environment. .A risk based security assessment method for bilateral power 
transactions is developed. The method takes advantage of risk based security assessment 
by considering the uncertainties in the real power system operating condition. Several 
risk allocation methods for simultaneous bilateral transactions are also discussed. Power 
flow based methods generally provide more accurate results than sensitivity based meth­
ods. but they are usually more time-consuming. Sensitivity based methods are relatively 
faster in providing risk allocation results. But accuracy is sacrificed due to the high non-
linearity of component risk functions. Furthermore, since an off-line simulation method 
is used to obtain the risk sensitivity factors, it is essential to obtain an accurate base 
ease forecast. 
7.1.5 Risk Based Optimal Power Flow 
There is a great deal of interest in using probabilistic methods to enhance the security-
economy decision-making problem in power system. The risk based optimal power flow 
developed in this study is e.xactly one of this kind of tools. The system operator can 
either set individual risk limit on each component, or set an overall system risk limit, or 
i;i2 
I real t ho system risk as a [)art of ohjcctivc. Risk Ijasecl OPF" is very useful to help the 
system operator to balance system risk and cost in the today's competitive environment. 
7.2 Suggestions for Future Work 
riie research presented in this dissertation was an attempt to develop methodologies 
for risk based security assessment and power dispatch. While progress was made in this 
research, it is recognized that many issues remain unsolved. More applications based 
on RB.SA also need to be further e.xplored. The following areas are suggested for future 
research. 
• Probabilistic information management 
Risk based security assessment needs a lot of probabilistic information about the 
system. The procedure and methodologies of collecting and estimating these in­
formation need to developed. 
• Impact assessment 
In this research, the classification of impacts for different security problems and 
some sample data in a template form are also presented. More refinements about 
these templates can be done based on survey or expert opinion from industry. 
• Variance of risk 
Variance of risk plays an important role in decision-making. More research work 
needs to done to investigate its impact on risk based decision-making. 
• Risk based optimal power flow 
Risk based optimal power flow is a highly nonlinear problem. In this research, 
successive linear programming is used to solve this problem. Other algorithms 
such as sequential cjuadratic programming and interior point methods should also 
be considered as candidates to solve this problem. 
v.y.i 
Risk assossnient for special protection systems 
A generation rejection scheme (CJRS) is used as an example to illustrate the SPS 
risk assessment procedure developed in this research. Other types of .SPS should 
also he investigated to refine and validate the [procedure. 
Risk based preventive and corrective control 
The objective of preventive and corrective control could be minimizing the system 
total risk. While the choosing of preventive and corrective controls could be based 
on sensitivity of risk against the control variables. 
.Applications in a competitive power market 
Risk based security assessment and optimal power flow provide very useful tools 
in a competitive market. The possible areas are congestion management, pricing 
transmission services, pricing ancillary services, available transfer capability (.\TC) 
calculation, etc. 
APPENDIX A LINEARIZED MODEL FOR 
PROBABILISTIC LOAD FLOW 
The calculation of the .Jaccobian matrix .4 for the lineraized model is presented in 
this appendix [-15]. Consider an operating state of the system, defined with the phase 
and voltage magnitude vectors. S and V. The objective is to compute a linearized model 
of the dependence of the power flow T,j on circuit ij. and the voltage 14 at bus k\ with 
respect to a set of selected bus loads. Ol-
In what follows, we will show how to calculate these four coefficient vectors. 
r>  ' JT , ,  
• Loniputmg 
Consider the P — S equations of the fast decoupled load flow [141]. 
S'Ai=[^) (A.l) 
.\t the operating condition. AP = 0. .Assume that the electric load at a specific 
bus. /. is distributed bv e. The vector AP will be 
AP = c[o/ (A.2) 
where q/ is the vector with all entries equal zero, e.xcept a 1.0 at the entry corre­
sponding to the bus I. Thus, we have 
OAS r , , l r O l  
- ' ® i  ' r '  
Siiicc 
OAS dTi jdS ,  dT , j  dS j  dT^ jOV,  ^ dT . jdX]  
Im ^ 'd^m '^Wi ^  oVj dPi 
Assuming = 0. ^ = 0. and observing \\'e liave 
dTij ^ or,J 05i dSi ^ dT,j Tron-lr"'i 
dPi 06^0Pi dPi^ ^ m ' 
where e,j is a column vector with 1.0 at entry ; and -1.0 at entry j. Finally, let P^ 
be the vector of probabilistic load, we get 
(A.;}) 
(A.-l) 
OTij dTij r _,,_J (.Q/t O/J < /^ni 
= "F - —1 
• Computing ^ 
Consider the Q — I ' equations of the fast decoupled load flow [1-41]. 
B"AV = [^] (A.7) 
.-\t the operating condition AQ = 0. Assume that the load at a specific bus I is 
disturbed by e. Thus, we have 
AQ = eei (A.S) 
where e/ is a vector with all entries zero except one corresponding to bus /. Then. 
we get 
i;{6 
— = wr [ ' ± \  (A.«, 
Now consider 
d\5 ^ ^ ^ 
OQi OS, dQi dSj dQi dV, OQi dVj OQi 
Assuming = 0. = 0. and substituting equation A.9 into equation A. 10. we 
obtain 
- (A.12) 
Finally, let Ql  be the vector of probabilistic reactive loads, we get 
P • OKB"]-' (A.US) 
oQ l  d \ ]  
Computing ^ 
From equation A.T. it is easy to get 
~ D 'n- l  




OP l  
= 0 (A. 15) 
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APPENDIX B IEEE RELIABILITY TESTING SYSTEM 
BUS 17 BUSS 
BU&16 
BUS 13 230 kV BUS 14 
Syaelt. 
Centf. BUS 15 




Figure B.l The IEEE Reliability Test System - 1996 
The data of this system is h'stecl in [oS]. 
i;{.s 
APPENDIX C COMPUTE THE VARIANCE OF RISK 
I'irst. the following Theorem is introduced [142]. 
Theorem I :  For any two random variables .V and V. 
V'flr(V) =  ^ (I 'aKV'IA')) + l- 'ar(£:(V'|.V)) ( c . i :  
provided that the expectations exist. The proof of this theorem can be found in Reference 
[1-12]. 
.Next, without loss of generality, the distribution of risk with GRS and without GR.S 






where .V, follows a normal distribution as cr,). //, is the e.xpected value and (T, is 
the variance, and p, is the probability of .V,. 
Thus, wc have the expected value of V is 
^ ( V ' )  =  X  / f ,  
1=1 
(C.2) 
Also, we have 
E(l-«r(V-|A')) = ' ^ p , x V e i r ( Y \ X  =  X . )  
i=l 
n 
= E". ) .  X  c r -





V a r ( E { y \ X ) )  =  E { ( E ( y \ X ) ~  E { Y \ X ) f )  (C.o) 
a 
= ^ (/'< - '^(V))' (C.6) 
1=1 
By using Theorem 1 and substituting eqs. C.2, C.4 and C.6 into eq. C.l. we obtain 
the variance of risk. 
1 10 
APPENDIX D THE MATHEMATICAL DERIVATION OF 
RSF 
Risk is a function of branch flows or bus voltages. Thus, we have 
ARisk = [ 1 




where T is the matrix of branch power flow and \' is the matrix of bus voltage magnitude. 
Also we have 
(D.2) 
AT AV 
= J t v  
AV AcJ 
OT OT 
av  06  
I  0  
where .I-rv = 
From load flow equation we have 
AV A P  
A S  
./ 
where J is the Jacobian matrix. 
By inverting the Jacobian matri.x, we have 
A V  A P  
A S  
(D.;5) 
(D.4) 
I l l  
('oini)ining e((l.s. I).I. D.2 D. 1 gives 
AHisk-  = [ - iR^sk  \ J - j -yJ  
'• iV 06 ' 
- 1  
AP 
(D.o) 
riuis. we get 
rSF = ]./rv-./"' I J I \ OP (D.6) 
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